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Introduction
The bank holding company-a company that owns or
controls a U.S. bank-is a legal and organizational form unique to
the U.S. system of bank regulation.' It has become a core principle of
U.S. financial services regulation that the parent company and non-
bank affiliates of a U.S. bank are subject to comprehensive
consolidated regulation and supervision by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve"). Yet, bank
holding companies were not directly regulated until the enactment of
the Bank Holding Company Act (the "BHCA") in 1956.2 All bank
holding companies required to register under the BHCA ("BHCs")
are subject to prudential oversight by the Federal Reserve, and their
permissible investments and activities have been restricted mainly to
owning and managing banks and conducting certain other activities
"closely related to banking."3
In recent years, the increasing concentration in the U.S.
banking sector and the expansion of non-banking activities of U.S.
banks and BHCs, particularly as a result of the enactment of the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the "GLBA"), 4 called into
question the continuing utility of BHC regulation. In the wake of the
recent financial crisis, however, Congress reaffirmed the central
importance of the BHC construct in the regulatory paradigm. The
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (the "Dodd-Frank Act"),5 widely viewed as the most far-
reaching financial sector reform legislation since the Great
Depression, expands the model of BHC regulation as the core
element in its new architecture of systemic risk regulation.
However, in order to develop a better understanding of
how-or even whether-the BHCA structure can be effectively
adapted to meet today's regulatory challenges, it is helpful to
examine how this legal concept evolved and how its underlying
' PAULINE HELLER & MELANIE FEIN, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY
LAW § 1.04[5], at 1-20 (2009).
2 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 1-12, 70
Stat. 134, 135 (1956).
3 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).
4 Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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policies and definitional boundaries shifted over time. A fresh look at
the history of the BHCA, especially from the vantage point of our
post-crisis wisdom, provides valuable context for the broader policy
debate on the future of the American financial system.
This Article focuses on one crucial aspect of this rich and
multi-faceted history. It traces the evolution of the statutory
definition of a "bank" for the purposes of the BHCA and the main
exemptions from this definition. The key to becoming a BHC subject
to the many activity restrictions and regulatory intrusions is control
or ownership of an entity that is considered a "bank" under the
BHCA. Yet, contrary to what most ordinary Americans may think,
what makes an institution a "bank" is not self-evident and depends
on whether the statute defines it as such. What types of financial
institutions that definition includes, or excludes, has changed several
times since 1956.
This Article presents a brief historical account of how and
why, and with what consequences, Congress periodically redefined
the universe of "banks" and their heavily regulated BHC-parents. For
decades after the enactment of the BHCA in 1956, this definition
played the key role in determining which holding companies were
included in the restrictive BHCA regulatory regime and which ones
were left outside of it. As originally enacted, the BHCA defined the
term based simply on the formal charter. In 1966, however, Congress
introduced a functional definition of "bank" based on whether or not
an institution accepted deposits that could be withdrawn on demand.
In 1970, that functional definition was narrowed by adding the
second requirement that a "bank" had to be engaged in the business
of making commercial loans. This definition allowed proliferation of
so-called "nonbank banks" that had access to federal deposit
insurance but structured their activities to avoid being included in the
definition of "bank."
In 1987, Congress outlawed such nonbank banks by broad-
ening the statutory definition to include, in addition, all federally-
insured depository institutions. At the same time, Congress created
explicit exemptions from that definition for certain categories of
federally-insured institutions, including industrial banks, thrifts,
credit unions, credit card banks and limited purpose trust companies.
This Article examines the origins and evolution of these exempted
industries and argues that their significance as organizational
alternatives to commercial banks is likely to diminish in the
emerging post-Dodd-Frank regulatory regime.
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Revisiting how the BHCA definition of "bank" changed over
time elucidates several broad themes relevant to today's financial
regulation reform. It is a fascinating story of how law shapes market
developments, and then, in turn, attempts to respond to such
developments. From this perspective, this Article contributes to the
growing body of academic literature examining the role of legal rules
in defining the general trajectory of socio-economic development.6 It
is also a story of how the law itself was shaped and influenced by
political forces and institutions. Adherents of various theoretical
paradigms-public choice, interest group politics, pluralist
democracy-have extensively researched this phenomenon in a wide
range of historical and subject-matter contexts. Tracing the history
of the BHCA and its key definition of a bank fits into that broad
theoretical paradigm. It is, however, the specific patterns of power
politics, which operated to exempt whole swaths of financial
activities from the reach of the bank holding company regulation,
that make this story not only fascinating from a historical perspective
but also instructive from the point of view of understanding current
political struggles over financial regulation reforms.
During the legislative negotiations of the Dodd-Frank Act,
the desirability of preserving the existing exemptions from the
BHCA definition of "bank" was a subject of intense debates.
Although the Presidential Administration generally advocated
elimination of the exemptions,8 Congress postponed the final
decision until the Government Accountability Office (the "GAO")
completes a mandatory study, identifying the nature and extent of
affiliation between exempted institutions and commercial companies
and determining whether the existing regulatory framework
6 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Priorities as
Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 541 (2011) (arguing
that preferential treatment of derivatives under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
contributed to the recent financial crisis); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending,
75 FORDHAM L. REv. 2039, 2041-42 (2007) (arguing that securitization
enabled predatory lending and growth of subprime mortgage markets).
7 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance,
91 COLUM. L. REv. 10, 18 (1991) (examining the history of the BHCA
through the lens of a public choice theory).
8 Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], United States: Publication of Financial Sector
Assessment Program Documentation-Technical Note on Consolidated
Regulation and Supervision, at 16, IMF Country Report No. 10/251 (July
23, 2010).
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adequately addresses the risks of such affiliations.9 This continuing
legislative concern with the policy of exempting certain financial
institutions from the BHCA further underscores the importance of re-
examining the history of these exemptions.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I provides a brief
overview of the BHCA statutory scheme and outlines the key shifts
in statutory policy priorities throughout the history of the BHCA.
Part II examines the political and economic dynamics that led to the
enactment of the BHCA in 1956. Part III traces the evolution of the
BHCA definition of "bank" from 1956 to 1987, when it was last
amended. It provides an overview of the policy reasons and interest
group dynamics that led to each major amendment. Part IV discusses
in greater detail the key categories of financial institutions exempted
from the definition of "bank" in the BHCA. Part V examines the
potential impact of the Dodd-Frank Act on the practical relevance of
the exemptions from the statutory definition of "bank." It also offers
general observations on some of the key lessons of the history of the
BHCA for the ongoing financial regulation reform.
L Background: Bank Holding Company Regulation in the
United States
For many companies, becoming a BHC subject to the BHCA
regulatory regime has significant legal and economic consequences,
particularly with respect to their ability to conduct non-banking and
non-financial activities. This Part briefly summarizes the key features
of the BHCA statutory scheme and argues that the primary policy
objectives of the BHCA evolved over time, in response to the
changes in market conditions and political dynamics. As originally
enacted, the BHCA was designed primarily to restrict geographic
expansion of large banking groups and to prevent excessive
concentration in the commercial banking industry. Gradually,
however, the key policy focus of the BHCA regime began to shift
toward defining the legal scope of permissible banking and "closely
related to banking" activities-a process that ultimately led to the
enactment of the GLBA in 1999 and the subsequent growth of
diversified financial holding companies. Finally, in the Dodd-Frank
Act, Congress re-conceptualized the key policy goal of the BHCA as
systemic risk prevention and elevated the statute to an unprecedented
9 Dodd-Frank Act § 603(b)(1).
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level of significance in the emerging post-crisis regulatory
framework.
A. The BHCA Statutory Scheme: Brief Overview
The BHCA generally defines a BHC as a "company"10 that
owns or "controls" one or more U.S. "banks."" Although the
definition of "control" for purposes of determining whether an entity
is a BHC is complicated and fact-dependent, the statute generally
presumes the existence of "control" where an entity owns more than
twenty five percent of any class of voting shares of a bank.'2 All
BHCs are required to register with, and become subject to consoli-
dated regulation and supervision by, the Federal Reserve. BHCs
submit mandatory periodic reports to the Federal Reserve, and are
subject to its direct examination authority. The Federal Reserve has
extensive enforcement powers over BHCs, which are subject to
capital adequacy regulation and must serve as a "source of strength"
to their bank subsidiaries.
The BHCA governs nearly all aspects of BHCs' businesses,
including acquisitions of additional banks13 and permissible non-
banking investments and activities.14 These substantive and
1o The BHCA defines "company" broadly:
"Company" means any corporation, partnership, busi-
ness trust, association, or similar organization, or any
other trust unless by its terms it must terminate within
twenty-five years or not later than twenty-one years and
ten months after the death of individuals living on the
effective date of the trust but shall not include any
corporation the majority of the shares of which are
owned by the United States or by any State, and shall
not include a qualified family partnership.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (2006).
" Id. § 1841(a)(1).
12 Id. § 1841(a)(2)(A). The precise threshold for the ownership stake
triggering the application of the BHCA depends, in each specific case, on
whether the Federal Reserve finds the existence of "controlling influence"
on the target company. Id. § 1841(a)(2)(C). Thus, ownership of as little as
ten percent of voting securities of any class often supports the finding of
"controlling influence" that triggers the application of the BHCA.
" Id. § 1842.
14 Id. § 1843(c).
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procedural rules are designed to implement the underlying policy
objectives of the BHCA: prevention of excessive concentration of
commercial credit and separation of banking and commerce.
The BHCA operationalizes the principle of keeping banking
separate from general commercial enterprise by restricting permis-
sible activities and investments of BHCs to banking, managing or
owning banks, and a limited set of activities determined to be
"closely related to banking."" The loss of an ability to own a
significant ownership stake in non-financial and even many non-
banking financial businesses is the most significant consequence of
becoming a BHC.
Under the GLBA, which partially repealed the Glass-Steagall
Act and legalized affiliations among banks and securities and
insurance firms, certain well-capitalized and well-managed BHCs1
may qualify for a status of a financial holding company ("FHC"),
which allows them to engage in a broader range of activities
"financial in nature."1 Such broadened permissible activities include
securities dealing and underwriting, insurance and merchant
banking. 8 In addition, the Federal Reserve may allow certain FHCs
to engage in purely commercial activities that are "complementary"
to their permissible financial activities. 9
As the umbrella supervisor over the entire BHC, the Federal
Reserve has the authority to examine all of its non-bank subsidiaries.
Under the GLBA, all functionally regulated non-bank BHC
subsidiaries-including securities broker-dealers, investment
advisers, insurance companies or commodity futures professionals-
are regulated and examined by the applicable primary regulatory
agency, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") or state
" Id. § 1843(c)(8).
A BHC is "well capitalized" if it maintains a total risk-based capital ratio
of ten-percent or greater; it maintains a Tier I risk-based capital ratio of six-
percent or greater; and it is not subject to any corrective action by the
Federal Reserve relating to capital levels. 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(1) (2006). A
BHC is "well managed" if it received a CAMEL composite rating of I or 2
in its most recent examination and at least a satisfactory rating for
management, if such rating is given. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(o)(9).
1 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A).
1 Id. § 1843(k)(4); see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.170 (2005) (listing permissible
investments and the conditions that must be met in order for FHCs to
engage in merchant banking).
19 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).
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insurance regulators. The Federal Reserve, however, retains back-up
examination authority with respect to functionally regulated
subsidiaries. Importantly, the Dodd-Frank Act further expanded the
Federal Reserve's authority to supervise and examine the
20functionally regulated subsidiaries of any BHC.
Thus, the BHC structure allows U.S. banking institutions to
expand and engage in certain non-banking activities but subjects
them to fairly intrusive group-wide regulation and supervision under
the BHCA scheme. Becoming a registered BHC therefore has
significant potential consequences for a company's business
operations and strategy. Not surprisingly, which companies fall
within and which ones remain outside the statutory definition of a
BHC has been one of the key political issues throughout the history
of the BHCA. A deeper appreciation and knowledge of that history is
a pre-requisite for understanding the evolving role of bank holding
company regulation in the United States.
B. The Shifting Policy Focus of the BHCA
Since its enactment in 1956, the BHCA has served multiple
policy purposes. The key policy focus of the BHCA regime shifted
over time, reflecting fundamental changes in market conditions and
political dynamics.
As enacted in 1956, the BHCA was designed principally as
an anti-monopoly law that sought to close the key "routes to a
national banking empire." 21 The primary policy goal of the new
statute was to restrict geographic expansion of large banking groups
and, more broadly, to prevent excessive concentration in the
commercial banking industry.22
Historically, U.S. banks have been severely restricted in their
ability to expand geographically and offer banking services within
20 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 605(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1604 (2010). Under the Dodd-Frank
Act, all non-functionally regulated subsidiaries of a BHC or a Savings and
Loan Holding Company ("SLHC") must be examined by the Federal
Reserve in the same manner and with the same frequency as if they were
FDIC-insured depository institutions. Id.
21 Note, The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 75 BANKING L. J. 277,
293 (1958).
22 Id. at 291.
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and across state lines. 2 3 Many state laws prohibited out-of-state banks
from establishing branches within their borders, largely due to the
interest of the owners of local banks in protecting themselves from
competition by larger banks in the market for commercial credit.24
The McFadden Act, as amended in 1933,25 "permitted national banks
to branch within a state to the extent permitted by state law," but
precluded interstate branching by limiting branching to the state in
26
which the national bank was situated. It did not address, however,
the interstate banking powers of bank holding companies. As a
result, before the passage of the BHCA, banks could form or
reincorporate themselves as holding companies and hold separately
incorporated banks in different states to engage in interstate banking,
without running afoul of the then-ubiquitous interstate banking
restrictions.2 7
In addition, such holding companies could conduct purely
commercial activities prohibited for banks. The Glass-Steagall Act of
1933, which prohibited banks from participating in the securities
dealing and underwriting business and from affiliating with securities
firms, otherwise did not impose any specific legal restrictions on the
activities of business entities that owned or controlled commercial
banks. Since the 1930s, political leaders expressed their concerns
with the potential for the formation of financial-industrial
monopolies, 29 and the Federal Reserve actively pushed for bank
23 LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK
FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 69 (4th ed. 2011).
24 For a more detailed history about how interstate banking restrictions
developed, see Robert T. Clair & Paula K. Tucker, Interstate Banking and
the Federal Reserve: A Historical Perspective, 1989 FED. RES. BANK OF
DALLAS ECON. REV. 1, 3 (1989).
25 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1933).
26 BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 23, at 69.
27 See Carl A. Sax & Marcus H. Sloan III, The Bank Holding Company
Amendments of 1970, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1203 (1970) ("The
bank holding company device enabled a parent holding company to
circumvent state restrictions on interstate branch banking. The parent could
control two or more banks in different states, without violating the anti-
branching prohibitions."); Note, supra note 21, at 278 ("Prohibitions against
interstate branch banking undoubtedly stimulated the use of the holding
company form.").
28 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
29 In 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sent a special message to
Congress urging the passage of legislation enhancing antitrust protections
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holding company legislation.30 But it was the active political
lobbying by small independent and community banks, trying to
protect their local markets from potential competition from large out-
of-state banks, which finally led to the passage of the BHCA in
1956.0
The passage of the BHCA effectively closed the possibility
for banks to use a holding company structure to avoid legal
restrictions on interstate banking and branching. Thus, Section 3(d)
of the BHCA (commonly known as the Douglas Amendment)
explicitly prohibited BHCs from acquiring banks outside of their
home state, unless the acquisition was specifically authorized by the
state law of the target bank. 2 Ultimately, safeguarding interstate
banking restrictions faded away as the primary policy purpose behind
against undue concentration of economic power in the hands of private busi-
nesses, including bank holding companies. Roosevelt's message reflected,
in part, his concern with the growing threat of fascism and the fear of the
anti-democratic effects of economic monopolies. HELLER & FEIN, supra
note 1,§ 17.01[2], at 17-4 to 17-5.
Id. § 17.01[4], at 17-7.
See Clair & Tucker, supra note 24, at 12 (explaining that the Douglas
Amendment, the part of the BHCA that effectively prohibited interstate
banking by BHCs, "was first proposed by the American Bankers Associa-
tion and was heavily supported by the Independent Bankers Association.").
32 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 3(d), 70 Stat.
134, 135 (1956). The Douglas Amendment prohibited BHCs from acquiring
banks outside of their home state:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no
application shall be approved under this section which
will permit any bank holding company or any subsidiary
thereof to acquire, directly or indirectly, any voting
shares of, interest in, or all or substantially all of the
assets of any additional bank located outside of the State
in which such bank holding company maintains its
principal office and place of business or in which it
conducts its principal operations unless the acquisition
of such shares or assets of a State bank by an out-of-
state bank holding company is specifically authorized by
the statute laws of the State in which such bank is
located, by language to that effect and not merely by
implication.
Id.
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the BHCA, but only after an intense legislative and regulatory
struggle.33
Moreover, the tendency toward increasing concentration of
bank lending has severely compromised the broader policy of
preventing excessive concentration of credit. 34 In the decades
3 Various legal and economic developments continued to undermine the
practical impact of interstate banking and branching restrictions in the years
after the passage of the Douglas Amendment. Thus, the Douglas
Amendment did not restrict the interstate expansion of non-bank offices. In
the 1970s, state legislatures began to allow out-of-state BHCs to control
banks in their states, often under various reciprocal arrangements. Further-
more, as a result of the Savings and Loan ("S&L") crisis in the 1980s, state
legislatures increasingly turned a blind eye to interstate branching
restrictions to allow for acquisitions of insolvent banks and thrifts by out-of-
state banks and BHCs. In 1994, Congress finally repealed the Douglas
Amendment and interstate branching restrictions through the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (the "Riegle-Neal Act"),
allowing banks to branch across state lines for the first time. For a more
detailed history of interstate branching, the Douglas Amendment and the
Riegle-Neal Act, see Christian A. Johnson & Tara Rice, Assessing a Decade
of Interstate Bank Branching, 65 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 73, 77-88 (2008)
(undertaking an economic analysis of the correlation between restrictive
state regulation and out-of-state branch banking entry); Edward J. Kane, De
Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 141, 141-48 (1996) (explaining the seemingly sudden willingness
to relax interstate banking restrictions in terms of increased failure rates and
reorganizations among depository institutions in the 1980s and early 1990s);
Note, supra note 21, at 283-84 (arguing that the Douglas Amendment was a
"major setback to the development of multi-office banking").
3 For discussions of the consolidation and concentration in the U.S.
banking sector, see Kenneth D. Jones & Tim Critchfield, Consolidation in
the U.S. Banking Industry: Is the "Long, Strange Trip" About to End?, 17
FDIC BANKING REVIEW 4, at 31-61 (2005) (examining the structural
changes in the banking industry from 1984 to 2003); Allen N. Berger et al.,
The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange
Trip It's Been, 1995 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 2, at 55-219
(1995) (examining the changes in banking industry structure in 1979-1995);
Allen N. Berger et al., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry:
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future, 1999 JOURNAL OF
BANKING AND FINANCE 23, at 135-94 (1999) (discussing a number of
adverse and positive consequences of financial services industry consolida-
tion); J. P. Hughes et al., The Dollars and Sense of Bank Consolidation,
1999 JOURNAL OF BANKING AND FINANCE 23, 291-324 (1999) (discussing
the incentives for banks to consolidate and finding that the benefits are
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following the enactment of the BHCA, the wave of bank mergers,
acquisitions, and consolidations, in response to the growing
competitive pressures and search for the economies of scale,
effectively created a two-tiered banking system in the United States,
where a small number of large financial groups hold the vast
majority of the banking industry's assets and liabilities, with the rest
dispersed widely among a far greater number of small and medium-
sized banks.35
Soon after 1956, the main focus of BHC regulation gradually
began shifting away from its original emphasis on prevention of
undue concentration of commercial bank credit toward the issue of
separation of banking and commerce.36  This shift reflected
fundamental changes in global and domestic financial markets. By
the 1970s, the interest rate volatility and growing competition in the
global and domestic financial markets fundamentally altered the
dynamics in the U.S. banking sector. Investment banks and other
market actors, which were not subject to the same regulatory
restrictions as banking institutions, took advantage of macro-
economic volatility by creating financial instruments that offered
higher returns to investors-such as money market mutual funds-
and steering commercial companies toward raising capital in
highest for banks engaging in interstate expansion that diversifies macro-
economic risk).
During the period between 1934 and 1980, the total number of
commercial banks in the U.S. remained relatively stable, oscillating only
slightly within the approximate range of 13,000 to 14,000 institutions. At
the end of 1980, the number of FDIC-insured commercial banks stood at
14,434, and their total assets were slightly below $1.9 trillion. Number of
Institutions, Branches and Total Qffices, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/
(click on "Commercial Bank"; then click on "CB0 1") (last visited Nov. 11,
2011). As of December 31, 2005, there were 7,526 FDIC-insured
commercial banks, with total assets of slightly over $ 9 trillion. Assets,
FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/ (click on "Commercial Bank"; then click
on "CBO9") (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). As of June 30, 2011, there were
6,413 FDIC-insured commercial banks, with total assets of over $12 trillion.
Statistics on Depository Institutions, FDIC, http://www2.fdic.gov/
SDI/main4.asp (last visited on November 19, 2011).
3 6 PATRICIA A. McCoy, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND THRIFTS § 4:03 (Matthew
Bender ed., 2nd ed., 2011).
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commercial paper and bond markets.3  In response to this
phenomenon of disintermediation, commercial banks and BHCs
began actively seeking expansion of permissible securities, insur-
ance, real estate and derivatives activities. 38 As a result, where to
draw the line between permissible and impermissible non-banking
activities of registered BHCs became the core issue in the
interpretation and implementation of the BHCA.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, federal banking regulators
gradually extended the scope of permissible banking and "closely
related to banking" activities, in order to ensure the continuing
economic viability of the U.S. banking industry in the increasingly
competitive global environment. 39 For instance, by 1987, the Federal
Reserve's interpretation of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act,
which prohibited member banks from affiliating with any entity
"engaged principally" in the underwriting and distribution of
securities, 40 effectively allowed BHCs to develop significant
securities operations through the establishment of so-called "Section
20" subsidiaries.4'
37 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation, Leverage, Bubbles,
and the Distribution of Income, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 235
(2010) (explaining how money market funds were created by institutions
not regulated by the FDIC in response to high interest rates); BROOME &
MARKHAM, supra note 23, at 52-55 (explaining that inflation in the 1960s,
coupled with the cap on interest rates banks could charge, led to increased
competition from money market funds, which "invest in short term money
market instruments, such as Treasury Bills, that pay interest to the
investor.").
3 The securities, insurance, real estate and other industries fiercely fought
against regulatory expansion of banking institutions' permissible activities.
3 See generally Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How
Derivatives Changed the "Business ofBanking," 63 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1041
(2009) (examining the evolution of the OCC's decisions allowing national
banks to conduct derivatives activities).
40 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
4 Beginning in 1978, the Federal Reserve gradually expanded the range of
securities activities permissible to BHCs' non-bank subsidiaries. See, e.g.
United Bancorp, 64 FED. RESERVE BULL. 222 (1978) (allowing United
Bancorp to form a subsidiary to engage de novo in underwriting and dealing
in government and municipal securities); Bankers Trust N. Y. Corp., 73 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 138, 152-53 (1987) (allowing Bankers Trust New York to
engage in commercial paper placement subject to certain limitations). In
1987, the Federal Reserve permitted BHCs' to underwrite and deal in
corporate securities through Section 20 subsidiaries, subject to the revenue
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In 1999, the GLB Act finally repealed portions of the Glass-
Steagall Act to "facilitate affiliation among banks, securities firms,
and insurance companies, permitting financial conglomerates to
cross-sell a variety of financial products to their customers."42 The
GLBA retained the principle of separation of banking and pure
commerce by a last minute amendment, which "deleted the portion
that would have allowed banks to engage in commercial activity."43
At the same time, the new law expanded the ability of certain well-
capitalized and well-managed BHCs that qualified for the new FHC
status to engage in certain commercial activities.Among other things,
the GLBA permitted FHCs to engage in merchant banking activities,
i.e., making controlling portfolio investments in non-financial firms,
subject to certain holding period limitations and the general prohibi-
tion on FHCs exercising routine management of their portfolio
companies.44 The GLBA also gave the Federal Reserve authority to
permit individual FHCs to engage in purely commercial activities
that are "complementary" to their financial in nature activities.4 5
Thus, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the main
remaining original policy objective of the BHCA was the separation
of banking and pure commerce. At the same time, the interplay of the
activity-broadening provisions of the GLBA and the exemptions
from the BHCA definition of "bank," discussed below, has
significantly weakened the wall between banking and commerce in
46
practice. As a result, the continuing practical relevance of the
BHCA regulatory regime came under intense criticism. To some, the
BHCA, as amended by the GLBA, was not robust enough to regulate
limitation, which was gradually increased to twenty-five percent of a securi-
ties subsidiary's gross annual revenue. Citicorp, J. P. Morgan & Co. Inc. &
Bankers Trust of N. Y. Corp., 73 FED. RESERVE BULL. 473, 502 (1987). See
also Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 839 F.2d 47,
49-50 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (denying petition
for review of the Federal Reserve's decision in Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co.
Inc. & Bankers Trust of N.Y. Corp. and five related decisions).
42 F. JEAN WELLS & WILLIAM D. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
30375, MAJOR FINANCIAL SERVICES LEGISLATION, THE GRAMM-LEACH-
BLILEY ACT (P.L. 106-102): AN OVERVIEW 2 (1999).
43 John Krainer, FRBSF Economic Letter 98-21: The Separation of Banking
and Commerce, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO LETTER (July
3, 1998), http://www.frbsf.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr98/el98-21.html.
44 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)-(I) (2006); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.170(a)-(f) (2005).
45 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).46 See infra Part IV.
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properly the risks posed by financial conglomeration.4 To others, the
GLBA did not go far enough in removing the obstacles on the path of
financial innovation and market efficiency.48 In general, however,
most critics agreed that the BHCA had largely outlived its
usefulness.4 9
The financial crisis of 2007-09 brought the seemingly
obsolete statute to the forefront of regulatory reform. The key piece
of post-crisis reform legislation, the Dodd-Frank Act, effectively
expands the BHCA model of regulation and supervision, with some
modifications, to all financial institutions designated as "systemically
important" and thus subject to consolidated supervision by the
Federal Reserve.o
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, all systemically significant
financial groups, regardless of whether or not they own a commercial
bank, have to register with and become subject to consolidated
supervision by the Federal Reserve in a manner similar to BHCs.
Among other things, the Federal Reserve has the power to impose
heightened capital requirements and other elements of prudential
regulation on systemically significant "non-bank financial com-
panies."5 1 Systemically important non-bank financial companies and
47 See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., How Should We Respond to the
Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates? 17 (George Washington Law
Sch. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 034, 2001), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=291859.
48 See, e.g., Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III & Robert C. Eager, The Separation
of Banking and Commerce Revisited, in MIXING OF BANKING AND
COMMERCE: THE 43RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON BANK STRUCTURE AND
COMPETITION: PROCEEDINGs 39,40 (Douglas D. Evanoff ed., 2007).
49 See, e.g., Carl Felsenfeld, The Bank Holding Company Act: Has It Lived
Its Life? 38 VILL. L. REV. 2 (1993); Keith R. Fisher, Orphan of Invention:
Why the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act Was Unnecessary, 80 OR. L. REV. 1301
(2001).
50 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 113, 124 Stat. 1376, 1398 (2010). The Financial Stability
Oversight Council ("FSOC"), a newly created systemic risk regulator,
makes the determination whether any entity is a systemically important
financial institution ("SIF"). Id.
51 Id. § 165. The statute defines a non-bank financial company as a
company "predominantly engaged in financial activities," meaning that at
least eighty-five percent of such company's consolidated gross revenues or
eighty-five percent of its consolidated assets are derived from activities
"financial in nature," as defined in section 4(k) of the BHCA. Id. §
102(a)(6).
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their subsidiaries are subject to the Federal Reserve's reporting
requirements, as well as examination and enforcement by the Federal
52Reserve. Although the statute requires the Federal Reserve to
consult with the primary regulators of the depository institutions and
functionally regulated subsidiaries of the systemically important non-
bank financial companies, the Federal Reserve has significant back-
up authority to take necessary actions with respect to any of these
entities.5 3
The principal difference in the treatment of systemically
important non-bank financial companies is that the non-banking
activity restrictions applicable to BHCs do not apply to non-bank
54financial companies. The Federal Reserve may require any non-
bank financial company supervised by it to form an intermediate
holding company to bring under a single roof all of the group's
"financial in nature" activities.55
In addition, the Federal Reserve now has the authority to be
the consolidated supervisor for savings and loan holding companies
("SLHCs"), 56 which were previously regulated by the Office of
Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), and for the new category of securities
52 The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Federal Reserve to tailor its supervision
and regulation of non-bank financial companies to the relevant industry
sector. Thus, the Federal Reserve must establish prudential standards for
non-bank financial companies that are no less stringent than standards
currently applicable to such companies, "taking into consideration their
capital structure, riskiness, complexity, financial activities (including the
financial activities of their subsidiaries), size, and any other risk-related
factors" the agency deems appropriate. Id § 165(a).
53 See id §§ 161-62 (describing the enforcement and examination powers of
the Federal Reserve).
54 Id. § 167(a).
5 Id § 167(b). The intermediate holding company regime is designed to
create a company that will be under the Federal Reserve supervision, while
keeping the parent outside of such supervision, except in limited
circumstances. The Federal Reserve must require any systemically
important non-bank financial company to establish an intermediate holding
company if it finds that such intermediate holding company is necessary for
appropriate supervision or to ensure that Federal Reserve supervision does
not extend to commercial activities. Id.
56 Id. § 312. See generally id §§ 604, 606; Savings and Loan Holding
Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,508 (Sept. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 238-239). This Article also refers to savings associations as
"thrifts" and to SLHCs as "thrift holding companies."
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holding companies ("SHCs")." Although the full details of these two
regulatory schemes are still being developed, the Federal Reserve's
rule-making to date clearly indicates that both SLHCs and, to a lesser
extent, SHCs are going to be subject to regulatory and supervisory
regimes essentially similar to the BHCA regime.
Thus, the post-crisis reform is reinventing the BHCA, which
was originally intended primarily to guard against the perceived
dangers of excessive concentration of financial and economic power
and the emergence of diversified financial-industrial conglomerates,
as the basic infrastructure for systemic risk regulation across the
entire financial services sector. In effect, the BHCA regulatory
regime is being adopted for a variety of financial institutions other
than traditional BHCs. To what extent this approach to systemic risk
regulation will be effective in practice remains to be seen.59
Nevertheless, revisiting the key factors that shaped the emergence
and subsequent evolution of the BHCA helps to develop a better
understanding of its current transformation.
II. Back to the Beginning: The Birth of the Statute
The BHCA was enacted in 1956 primarily to thwart what
was perceived as a trend toward greater concentration in the
commercial banking markets and, more specifically, to prevent banks
from engaging in defacto interstate banking.
Bank holding companies emerged in the early 1900s as a
form of so-called "chain" banking, as opposed to the traditional
"unit" banking.60 Although they quickly drew criticism from bankers
and policy-makers, neither state nor federal legislation at the time
limited the use of a holding company structure as a method of
61
establishing banking operations in multiple states. In the absence of
5 Dodd-Frank Act § 618. See generally Supervised Securities Holding
Companies Registration, 76 Fed. Reg. 54,717 (proposed Sept. 2, 2011) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 241).
51 See generally Regulation LL, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,508 (Sept. 13, 2011) (to be
codified 12 C.F.R. pt. 238); Regulation MM, 76 Fed. Reg. 56,508 (Sept. 13,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 239); Regulation 00, 76 Fed. Reg.
54,717 (Sept. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 241).
59 For some observations on this issue, see infra Part V.B.
6o George S. Eccles, Registered Bank Holding Companies, in THE ONE-
BANK HOLDING COMPANY 82, 84-85 (Herbert V. Prochnow ed., 1969).
61 Id. at 85-86.
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regulation, bank holding companies proliferated and became a
significant force in the financial market in the late 1920s, during the
62pre-Depression boom era.
Yet, the New Deal reform, which significantly shaped the
modern system of financial regulation in the United States, did not
63directly address the status of bank holding companies. The Glass-
Steagall Act, adopted in 1933, created a system of separation
between banks and securities firms but otherwise did not limit
permissible activities of companies that owned commercial banks.64
This regulatory vacuum created numerous opportunities for the use
of the holding company structure by companies seeking to escape the
legal restrictions on mixing banking and commerce and geographic
expansion of banks.
After World War II, when commercial companies began to
acquire banks at a rapid rate, bank ownership through a holding
company structure became the "generally accepted model."6 5
62 Id. at 86.
63 The Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933),
however, made the first attempt to introduce some form of regulation of
bank holding companies. The statute required bank holding companies that
owned a majority of shares of any bank member of the Federal Reserve
System to register with the Federal Reserve and obtain the Federal
Reserve's permit to vote their shares in the selection of directors of any such
member-bank subsidiary. Id § 5144. To avoid this requirement, a bank
holding company could either avoid majority stakes in member-banks or
refrain from voting its shares. Id. The statute granted a blanket exemption
for holding companies that owned only one member-bank. See Burton Alan
Abrams, An Economic Theory of Lobbying: A Case Study of the U.S.
Banking Industry 110 (1974) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State
University) ("The Bank Act of 1933 constituted the first attempt at federal
regulation of bank holding companies.").
64 See generally Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). It
is often inaccurately asserted that the Banking Act of 1933 created the
separation of banking and commerce. In fact, the Banking Act of 1933
prohibited affiliations between insured depository institutions and entities
"engaged principally" in the underwriting of debt and equity securities. Id.
§ 5144(e)(1).
65 Walker F. Todd, The Evolving Legal Framework for Financial Services,
13 CATO J. 207, 208 (1993) (recognizing that the present common legal
form of large banking corporations in the United States, a bank holding
company with many banking and non-banking subsidiary corporations, was
rare in the 19th century and became the generally accepted model only after
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Importantly, this feature of the pre-BHCA regulatory regime was
highly beneficial to small banking institutions that did not seek
interstate expansion. In the mid-1950s, the U.S. banking market was
highly decentralized and comprised thousands of small banks
operating in geographically limited areas and owned by local
business elites. Thus, at the time, it was typical for the owners of
small state banks to own local commercial companies as well. 66
As the use of the bank holding company form by larger
banks grew, the opposition from independent state banks, which felt
increasingly threatened by the potential entrance in local markets of
67
out-of-state competitors, began to mount. Senator Carter Glass,
who spent thirty-two years on the House and Senate Banking and
Currency Committees, described the self-interested motives of
independent and community bankers:
The fact is that the little banker is the monopolist. He
wants to exclude credit facilities from any other
source than from his bank. He wants to monopolize
the credit accommodations of his community. He
does not want any other bank in his State to come
there. If it is a manufacturing enterprise, he wel-
comes it. Whether it be a branch of some great
industrial operation or otherwise, he welcomes it; but
if it is to trade in credit, if it is to accommodate the
commercial and industrial borrowing demands of the
community, he wants to monopolize that himself.68
The Independent Bankers Association of America (the
"IBAA"), representing small independent and community banks, was
one of the fiercest advocates of new legislation that would limit and
regulate bank holding companies. Most importantly, the IBAA
World War II); Carter H. Golembe, One-Bank Holding Companies, in THE
ONE-BANK HOLDING COMPANY 66, 71 (Herbert V. Prochnow, ed., 1969).
66 d. at 68.
67 See Roe, supra note 7, at 21-23. See also Note, supra note 21, at 278-79
("Opposition grew as holding companies swept across state lines. Oppo-
nents argued that holding companies were not sufficiently responsive to the
needs of the community, were subject to a conflict of interests, were
diminishing or eliminating competition and were often merely a subterfuge
for the evasion of state and federal laws.").
75 Cong. Rec. 9892 (1932) (remarks of Senator Glass).
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wanted to stop larger banks from expanding their interstate banking
capacity.69 Even before the 1950s,the small community and
independent banking industry exerted a great deal of political power
and influence, as "small-town bankers [were] disproportionately
represented in the Senate."70 Small businesses were also politically
influential; along with money and status, small business people were
sufficiently geographically dispersed to make "many in Congress
responsive to their needs."'
These interest groups' lobbying efforts, driven by their fear
of what they viewed as unfair competition from large "money-center
banks," were particularly effective not only because of the sheer
political power of independent and community banks but also
because their ideological stance reflected the deeply rooted
traditional American distrust of big businesses. Having aligned
themselves ideologically with the majority of ordinary Americans
sharing the belief that "large institutions and central accumulations of
economic power [were] inherently undesirable," these interest groups
were able to exert pressure on Congress to take the appropriate
action. 2
The Federal Reserve was another key player in the passage
of the BHCA. As the country's central bank and the primary federal
regulator of state-chartered member banks, the Federal Reserve
expressed concern over the rapidly growing network of bank holding
69 Amend the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956: Hearing on S. 2523, S.
2418, and H.R. 7371 Before the Subcomm. Of the Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 89th Cong. 457 [hereinafter 1966 Hearings] (1966).
70 Roe, supra note 7, at 49.
71 Id. at 47.
72 Id. at 33. In addition to the IBAA, the primary interest groups lobby-
ing for the passage of the BHCA were the American Bankers Association,
the National Federation of Independent Business, the National Association
of Supervisors of State Banks, the Association of Reserve City Bankers and
a handful of state bankers associations. Providing for Control and
Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on S. 829 Before the
Committee on Banking and Currency, 80th Cong. 20 (1947); Bank Holding
Bill: Hearings on S. 2318 Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on
Banking and Currency, 81st Cong. 101 (1950); Bank Holding Legislation:
Hearings on S. 76 and S. 1118 Before the Committee on Banking and
Currency, 83rd Cong. 56-57 [hereinafter 1954 Hearings] (1954); Table of
Contents to Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings
on H.R. 2674 Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong.
iv-v [hereinafter 1955 Hearings] (1955).
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companies as early as 1927 and repeatedly attempted to introduce
bank holding company legislation throughout the 1930s.74 Thus, in
1947, the Federal Reserve's proposed draft legislation was approved
by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency and contained
many of the provisions on regulation and supervision of bank
holding companies later included in the BHCA. While none of the
Federal Reserve's proposed bills were ultimately enacted, they
became a part of the long series of attempts by the critics of the
unregulated bank holding company model to have Congress enact
76legislation closing that regulatory gap.
Much like the independent and community banks, the
Federal Reserve pursued its own institutional interests in pushing
Congress to pass laws regulating bank holding companies. A big part
of what motivated the Federal Reserve's interest in bank holding
company legislation was its desire to protect its administrative turf
and further consolidate its own power. In 1954, Representative
Wright Patman introduced a bill to audit the Federal Reserve, which
if passed, would have greatly compromised the Board's autonomy
7 Carl T. Arit, Background and History, in THE ONE-BANK HOLDING
COMPANY 12, 16 (Herbert V. Prochnow, ed., 1969).
74 R.D. III, Note, Approaches to Regulation of One-Bank Holding
Companies, 55 VA. L. REv. 952, 954 (1969).
75 See HELLER & FEIN, supra note 1, at 17-7 ("The Board's draft legislation
to strengthen bank holding company regulation was approved by the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency on June 19, 1947. Many of the
provisions of the bill found their way into the legislation that eventually was
enacted as the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.").
76 Thus, in 1938, Senators Carter Glass and William McAdoo introduced
bank holding company legislation, at the urging of the President. S. REP.
No. 84-1095, at 3 (1955) ("In 1938, in a special message to Congress, the
President urged that the Congress enact legislation that would effectively
control the operation of bank holding companies; prevent holding
companies from acquiring control of any more banks, directly or indirectly;
prevent banks controlled by holding companies from establishing any more
branches; and make it illegal for a holding company or any corporation or
enterprise in which it is financially interested to borrow from or sell
securities to a bank in which it holds stock."). Following the failure of that
bill, bank holding company legislation was introduced every two to three
years for the next seventeen years. S. REP. No. 84-1095, at 3-4 (1955)
(noting Senate bills that were introduced in 1938, 1941, 1945, 1947, 1949,
1953, and 1955).
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and function. The bill sought to give the Comptroller General the
authority to conduct a complete audit of the Federal Reserve,
specifically the twelve Federal Reserve banks and the Open Market
Committee, none of which had been subject to a thorough audit for
forty years since the creation of the Federal Reserve System.7 8
During congressional hearings, the Federal Reserve stressed the
importance of its independent judgment in controlling monetary
policy and the needlessness of "[superimposing] a further budgetary
and auditing review upon the existing procedures."7 9 In order to
preserve its independence and consolidate regulatory power, the
Federal Reserve mobilized small banks to defeat Patman's audit bill
and lobby for bank holding company legislation, thus securing its
place as the principal regulatory agency for bank holding
companies.80
77 See H.R. 7602, 83d Cong. (2d Sess. 1954) (indicating that Patman
introduced the bill); Hearings before the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations,
83d Cong. 974 [hereinafter statement of Win. McC. Martin, Jr.] (1954)
(statement of William Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.).
See Hearings before the H. Comm.. on Gov't Operations, 83d Cong. 974
(2d Sess. 1952). In the wake of the recent financial crisis, the Federal
Reserve came under similar pressure with Ron Paul's attempts to audit the
Federal Reserve. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1254(c) (as passed by
House of Representatives, December 11, 2009). As a political compromise,
the GAO was required to perform a one-time audit of the Federal Reserve's
emergency assistance during the financial crisis, examining all loans and
other financial assistance provided through the Federal Reserve's exercise
of section 13(3) authority between December 1, 2007, and July 21, 2010.
The Federal Reserve was required to publish the results of the audit and
supporting documentation on its website. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 124 Stat. 1376,
2118 (2010); id. § 1109.
79 See statement of Win. McC. Martin, Jr., supra note 77, at 3 ("Legislation
to superimpose a further audit of these operations by another government
agency would make for duplication and needless expense. Moreover, the
audit might constitute an entering wedge in encroaching upon that inde-
pendence of judgment which Congress sought to safeguard. Such
independence of judgment is indispensable in the determination and
execution of impartial credit and monetary policy.").
80 WILLIAM JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32767, INDUSTRIAL
LOAN COMPANIES/BANKS AND THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND
COMMERCE: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 3 (2005).
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In 1956, after years of unsuccessful attempts, the advocates
of bank holding company legislation had finally seized the right
political moment, aided by the wave of renewed fear of holding
companies creating financial-economic empires spanning across state
borders. The political target of the BHCA was a single company,
Transamerica Corp., the "archetypal bank holding company" and the
much-maligned symbol of dangerous concentration of financial and
economic power.8' In the 1950s, Transamerica was a formidable
presence in the national economy, especially in the Western part of
the U.S. In addition to controlling the Bank of America 2 and other
banks in Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon and Washington,
Transamerica owned several non-banking enterprises, including
insurance companies, real estate and oil development operations, a
fish packer, a metal fabricator, an ocean shipping enterprise and
taxicab operations.83 What made things appear especially ominous to
the defenders of local banking markets was that Transamerica had
allegedly begun planning to continue expanding its banking services
84eastward, reaching for a truly nationwide presence.
The Federal Reserve targeted its efforts at Transamerica as
early as 1948, when it alleged that Transamerica had violated federal
antitrust laws prohibiting anticompetitive practices and the creation
of monopolies. 85 In 1952, the Federal Reserve "ordered Transamerica
to divest all of its subsidiary banks and dispose of all of its stock of
81 WILLIAM JACKSON & HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 86-26E,
THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACT: BACKGROUND, SUMMARY, AND
ANALYSIS 4 (1986); see also 1966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 457 ("A very
important reason on the part of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System for seeking this legislation was the existence of the very
large bank holding company, Transamerica Corp., which over many years
owned control of the Bank of America ... . Members of the Board of
Governors felt that Federal control of this great organization was vitally
necessary because of its rate of growth and its wide field of coverage.").
82 By 1952, Transamerica no longer owned any stock in Bank of America.
Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 206 F. 2d
163, 166-67 (1953).
83 JACKSON & COHEN, supra note 81, at 3; Control of Bank Holding
Companies: Hearing on S. 2577 Before the S. Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 84th Cong. 49, 49-52 (1956) [hereinafter 1956 Hearings] (state-
ment of F. N. Belgrano, Jr., President and Chairman, Transamerica Corp.).
84 JACKSON & COHEN, supra note 81, at 3.
85 HELLER & FEIN, supra note 1, at 17-14.
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Bank of America,,86 a move that was later overturned by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals. While Transamerica won the case against
the Federal Reserve, the attention that had built up around
Transamerica "confirmed the need for a stronger bank holding
company law to guard against such concentrations of banking
resources."Combined with the zealous lobbying efforts of
independent bankers, the Federal Reserve was able to succeed in
pushing for bank holding company legislation in 1956.9
As enacted on May 9, 1956, the BHCA excluded companies
that owned or controlled only one bank-one-bank holding
companies-from being designated as BHCs subject to the
comprehensive consolidated regulation and supervision by the
Federal Reserve. 90 This exclusion was a major political victory for
86 d.
8 Transamerica Corp., 206 F.2d at 171. See also HELLER & FEIN, supra
note 1, at 17-15.
8 HELLER & FEIN, supra note 1, at 17-15.
89 See 1954 Hearings, supra note 72, at 302 (Statement of Senator
Robertson) ("[The] Independent Bankers Association, with a lot of members
in Minnesota and in California, has been very insistent upon this type of
legislation. The Independent Bankers generally over the Nation favor
legislation of the proper kind, but they haven't been as insistent as the
independent bankers of Minnesota and of California, where Transamerica
operates and where this witness' bank operates. There is a very strong
demand for legislation of this kind. . . . They spent a lot of time trying to
convict Transamerica of violation of the antitrust laws, and finally lost their
case in the circuit court of appeals.").
90 The original version of the BHCA defined a BHC to exclude one-bank
holding companies:
"Bank holding company" means any company (1) which
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with
power to vote, 25 per centum or more of the voting
shares of each of two or more banks or of a company
which is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue
of this Act, or (2) which controls in any manner the
election of a majority of the directors of each of two or
more banks, or (3) for the benefit of whose shareholders
or members 25 per centum or more of the voting shares
of each of two or more banks or a bank holding
company is held by trustees; and for the purposes of this
Act, any successor to any such company shall be
deemed to be a bank holding company from the date as
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the small independent bank lobby, which prevailed over the strong
objections of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve pushed for
the inclusion of one-bank holding companies within the original
BHCA, as excluding them was "logically indefensible." 9'
Congressional hearings for the BHCA suggest that certain Senators
were not convinced of this logic. 92 Senator Robertson remarked:
There are over 100 holding companies that have
only 1 bank. They do not want more banks. They are
not in the banking business. That is an investment,
and that is all there is to it. But we cover the 50 that
were not operating on that basis. They were in the
position of constant expansion. We thought the time
had definitely come to put some curb on that, and
that is all this bill does."93
Importantly, however, members of Congress were also
acutely aware of the political price of going against small
independent banks and local business groups that sought to protect
their ability to combine banking and commerce in their local
markets. A later study found:
The Independent Bankers Association was still after
a death sentence, but only for companies controlling
two or more banks. Its spokesman said the one-bank
firms posed no threat to independent banking. Key
Congressmen agreed, for a very practical reason:
of which such predecessor company became a bank
holding company.
Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(a), 70 Stat. 133, 133
(1956).
91 1956 Hearings, supra note 83, at 58 (statement of F. N. Belgrano,
President and Chairman of the Board, Transamerica Corp.).
92 See 1956 Hearings, supra note 83, at 60-61 (statement of Sen. Lehman)
(stating that "in the minds of a number of members of the committee there
was a reason for exempting the one-bank concerns").
93 1956 Hearings, supra note 83, at 80 (statement of Senator Robertson).
See also 1956 Hearings, supra note 83, at 59 (statement of F. N. Belgrano,
President and Chairman of the Board, Transamerica Corp.) (stating that
including one-bank holding companies in the definition of a BHC would
bring about 117 companies within the scope of the BHCA).
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they were convinced that inclusion of the one-bank
companies would lose votes needed for passage of
any legislation.94
According to the accompanying Senate report, the BHCA
was rooted in the belief that "bank holding companies ought not to
manage or control nonbanking assets having no close relationship to
banking." 95 The history of the one-bank holding company exemption
demonstrates, however, that the principle of separation of banking
and commerce applied rather selectively to prohibit commingling of
these activities only by large banking groups. Small independent
banks, on the other hand, were free to affiliate with local commercial
businesses as long as they stayed within the one-bank holding
company exclusion. Therefore, the original BHCA was, in fact, much
more fundamentally driven by the belief that "adequate safeguards
should be provided against undue concentration of control of banking
activities."96
The independent bankers' political victory, however, proved
to be a double-edged sword in the long run. A review of the BHCA
by a prominent finance firm noted:
It is ironic that the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 stemmed originally from efforts by independ-
ent bankers to remove the holding company from the
banking scene; what hasactually happened is that the
holding company has received legislative approval.
What some had hoped would be a death sentence has
turned out to be a passport to the future.97
III. Who Is In? The Evolution of the Statutory Definition of
"Bank"
The enactment of the BHCA in 1956 created a new
institutional framework that favored the owners of small and local
banks over the larger banks that sought to expand nationally. Not
surprisingly, the results of that particular legislative bargain were not
stable. Since the original enactment of the BHCA, Congress
94 Eccles, supra note 60, at 93.
95 S. REP. No. 84-1095, at 1 (1955).
96 Id.
97 Eccles, supra note 60, at 96.
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amended the statutory definition of the term "bank" three times: in
1966, 1970 and 1987. Each of these three amendments was an
important milestone in the historical development of the statutory
scheme, reflecting shifting policy priorities with respect to interstate
banking, the scope of permissible non-banking activities of banks'
corporate parents, or the separation of banking and commerce.
Tracing the evolution of this key statutory definition helps to
understand the broader economic and political dynamics that shaped
bank holding company regulation in the second half of the twentieth
century.
A. The 1966 Amendments
The main focus of the first Congressional action to amend
the BHCA was the statutory definition of "company." Overall, the
1966 Amendments were favorable to regulated BHCs.98 These
amendments were enacted primarily to bring one financial institu-
tion-the Alfred I. duPont testamentary estate, which controlled
numerous banks and non-banking enterprises through the duPont
Trust-within the scope of the BHCA. 99
The legislative history of the original BHCA shows that
Congress was aware of the duPont Trust's size and activities, but had
intentionally exempted it from the BHCA by excluding non-business
trusts from the definition of "company.""oo The 1966 Amendments
eliminated the exemption for long-term or perpetual trusts, as well as
religious, charitable or educational institutions. 01 These entities were
98 Abrams, supra note 63, at 113.
99 1956 Hearings, supra note 83, at 64-65.
00 Congress placed significant weight on the duPont Trust's "testamentary
trust" form and distinguished it from companies like Transamerica, based
on the notion that duPont Trust was subject to the limitations of the trust
instrument. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 2(b), 80 Stat. 236,
236 (1966).
101 The 1966 Amendments retained the exemption for short-term non-
business trusts. In order to be considered short-term, a non-business trust
must "terminate within twenty-five years or not later than twenty-one years
and ten months after the death of individuals living on the effective date of
the trust." Id.
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now considered "companies" that would become BHCs if they
controlled two or more banks.102
The primary catalyst for the duPont Trust's inclusion within
the BHCA was the labor union strike against the Florida East Coast
Railway in 1963, a railway owned by the duPont Trust.103 Following
disputes over wage increases and other contractual changes, and a
refusal by the Railway to conform to the terms of the national
settlement, the unions orchestrated a strike that lasted a number of
years and sought congressional action to pressure the Railway into
settling. 104 Whether this strategy would have worked in reality is
unclear. The labor unions seemed to believe that the Railway "had
only been able to withstand the strike for so long because [it] had the
whole vast Du Pont(sic) estate behind [it]," although the company
executives testified that the Railway "[had] not received $1 of
assistance from the Du Pont(sic) estate or from its banking and
associated interests."105  After the enactment of the 1966
Amendments, the duPont Trust sold the ownership stake in its banks
to avoid becoming a BHC and continued operating its non-banking
enterprises, including the Florida East Coast Railway.106
Although the 1966 Amendments were driven by Congress'
resolve to bring the duPont Trust under the BHCA regulatory regime,
ironically, the more significant long-term effect of these
Amendments was to limit the reach of the BHCA by changing the
key statutory definition of "bank."
102 Incidentally, the Federal Reserve also lobbied for eliminating the original
exemption of one-bank holding companies from the BHCA but failed to get
that amendment through Congress.
103 1966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 572 (Statement of Sen. Wallace F.
Bennett) ("[T]his issue [referring to the exemption of the duPont Trust from
the BHCA] was still alive and in existence in 1956, when the original Bank
Holding Company Act was passed and at that time it was decided it was no
problem. It only became a problem when there was a strike on the Florida
East Coast Railway Co.").
104 1966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 497-511 (Statement of Winfred L.
Thornton, President, Florida East Coast Railway Co.). The unions lobbied
Congress to amend the BHCA as a way of exerting pressure on the duPont
Trust and forcing a settlement of the strike on the Railway. Id., at 501.
105 Id. at 509.
106 Financial Timeline, ALFRED 1. DUPONT TESTAMENTARY TRUST,
http://alfrediduPonttrust.org/trust/timeline financial.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2011). The strike on the Railway ended on April 9, 1976. SETH H.
BRAMSON, IMAGES OF RAIL: FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY 112 (2006).
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In its original form, the BHCA defined "bank" by charter
type to mean "any national banking association or any State bank,
savings bank, or trust company" and explicitly excluded only those
entities that were organized by U.S. bank holding companies to
operate offshore. 0 7 The 1966 Amendments narrowed the scope of
the BHCA by redefining "bank" to refer only to institutions that
accepted demand deposits, or deposits that may be withdrawn at any
time and do not require prior notice of withdrawal to be given to the
depository institution."
The legislative history of the 1966 Amendments shows that
Congress deliberately sought to narrow the scope of what it
perceived to be an unnecessarily broad definition, given the key
policy purposes of the BHCA. 109 More specifically, Congress
narrowed the statutory definition to exclude corporate owners of
certain types of financial institutions-savings banks, industrial
banks and non-deposit trust companies-from regulation as BHCs.110
Congress explained its decision:
The purpose of the act was to restrain undue concen-
tration of control of commercial bank credit, and to
prevent abuse by a holding company of its control
over this type of credit for the benefit of its
nonbanking subsidiaries. This objective can be
achieved without applying the act to savings banks,
and there are at least a few instances in which the
reference to "savings bank" in the present definition
may result in covering companies that control two or
more industrial banks. To avoid this result, the bill
redefines "bank" . . . so as to exclude institutions
1o7 That is, Edge Act and so-called agreement corporations. Bank Holding
Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(c), 70 Stat. 133, 133 (1956)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2010)). These entities con-
tinue to be exempted from the definition of "bank."12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)
(2010). This Article, however, does not discuss these exemptions.
10' Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 3(c), 80 Stat. 236, 236 (1966)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (c) (2010)). By contrast, time
deposits can only be withdrawn after a fixed period of time has passed, so
that premature withdrawals typically result in a penalty. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 204.2(c)(1) (2011).
'
09 S. REP. No. 89-1179, at 7 (1966).
iro See id. (defining bank as "an institution that accepts deposits payable on
demand").
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like industrial banks and nondeposit trust com-
panies.'
Congress chose to achieve its objective by narrowing the
statutory definition instead of explicitly exempting individual
categories of financial institutions that, in Congress' opinion, did not
pose a real danger of undue concentration of control over the flow of
commercial bank credit.' 2
This drafting choice, while successfully achieving the self-
proclaimed congressional goal, inadvertently created an entirely new
avenue for various non-banking entities to control deposit-taking and
lending institutions without being subject to regulation and
supervision by the Federal Reserve. As long as their quasi-banking
subsidiaries refrained from accepting deposits that could be legally
withdrawn on demand-a fairly narrowly defined technical
requirement-these holding companies were free to engage in both
commercial and defacto banking activities.
B. The 1970 Amendments
The catalyst for the next round of major revisions of the
BHCA was the rapid proliferation, during the late 1960s, of one-bank
holding companies, originally exempted from regulation as BHCs.
The magnitude of the change was truly astounding:
In 1956, there were an estimated 11 7 one-bank
holding companies, with assets of $11 billion. In
1965, there were 550 one-bank holding companies,
with commercial deposits of $15.1 billion. By the
end of 1969, this number had grown to more than
890 one-bank holding companies with commercial
deposits exceeding approximately $181 billion-a
figure representing 43 percent of all deposits in
insured commercial banks in the United States."'
1 Id.
112 At the time, industrial banks, savings banks, and non-depository trust
companies did not take what technically qualified as "demand deposits" and
were small local institutions.
113 Sax & Sloan, supra note 27, at 1201 (footnotes omitted).
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However, it was not just the number of new unregistered
bank holding companies that pushed Congress to act. In contrast to
1956, when a typical one-bank holding company combined a local
commercial firm with a small local bank, this new generation of one-
bank holding companies consisted of so-called "congenerics," or
groups centered around a large bank seeking nationwide market
presence.114
This explosion in the growth of congeneric holding com-
panies in the late 1960s was attributable to several factors, including
increased competition for deposits from non-banking financial
institutions and advances in available technology.' 1 Because the
major advantage of being a one-bank holding company was the
ability to engage freely in non-banking and non-financial activities,
many such companies diversified their business and investment
portfolios by moving into real estate, insurance, and a variety of
other business lines typically impermissible for regulated BHCs.'16
Through this expansion into new product and geographic markets,
one-bank holding companies were able to offer a wider range of
financial and non-financial products to their clients and to increase
their general profitability."'
By the end of 1968, thirty-four large commercial banks
(including the six largest) had created or announced plans to create
114 Golembe, supra note 65, at 68-69.
115 Sax & Sloan, supra note 27, at 1209 ("Throughout the 1960's, competi-
tion for savings from other types of financial institutions had grown so
intense, and technological developments had so changed the nature of
banking, that the congeneric holding company was a logical outgrowth of
failure to include the one-bank holding company under the 1956 Act.").
Thus, the advent of the computer along with other advances in technology
enabled banking organizations to offer a broad range of new customer servi-
ces, including "record keeping, computer service, lease financing and credit
cards." Id (quoting Note, Banks and Banking: The 1956 Bank Holding
Company Act and the Development of One Bank Holding Companies, 23
OKLA. L. REv. 73, 83 (1970)). These developments encouraged banks to
diversify their businesses and "enter new and potentially more profitable
areas of the economy" (i.e., non-banking activities). Sax & Sloan, supra
note 27, at 1209.
16 Id at 1208.
11 See id. at 1209-10 (discussing the growth of one-bank holding com-
panies, as well as stating the view that such companies "had been [the] most
energetic in responding to the needs of the public for expanded financial
services").
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one-bank holding companies.118 Like their multibank counterparts,
one-bank holding companies had become a matter of "grave
concern"11 9 to many small and community banks, symbolizing the
"continuing threat of big business to break out of the regulatory
bonds which purportedly protect the public against the economic
tyrannies of the nineteenth century business cartels." 1 20 Congress
faced pressure from the Federal Reserve,121 the Treasury
Department,12 2 the FDIC123 and the Nixon Administration 24 to
11i Id. at 1209; see also S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 1-3 (1970) (discussing the
growth and history of one-bank holding companies).
119 Sax & Sloan, supra note 27, at 1210.
120 Id (quoting Franklin R. Edwards, The One-Bank Holding Company
Conglomerate: Analysis and Evaluation, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1275, 1275-76
(1969)).
121 S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 3 (1970); see also One-Bank Holding Company
Legislation of 1970: Hearing on S. 1052, S. 1211, S.1664, S. 3823, and HR.
6778 Before the S. Comm. On Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 140
[hereinafter 1970 Hearings] (1970) (Statement of Arthur F. Burns,
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) ("In 1956
and again in 1966, your committee decided not to apply this principle to
companies that only own one bank. In scheduling the present hearings you
have recognized, however, the need to reconsider this decision in the light
of the new wave of one-bank holding companies formed in the past 2
years.... Whatever the reasons for exempting one-bank holding companies
may have been in 1956 or in 1966, the time is clearly at hand when
Congress must decide whether the rules against mixing banking and other
businesses in a holding company system should apply to one-bank holding
companies or should be abandoned. It is discriminatory to apply these rules
solely to the registered bank holding companies, which have fewer banks
and a much smaller share of deposits than the exempt companies."). See id.
for detailed statistics on one-bank holding companies from the mid-1960s to
1970s.
122 1970 Hearings, supra note 121, at 7-8 (Statement of Charls E. Walker,
Under Secretary, Dep't of the Treasury) ("The Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, which provided the first comprehensive Federal regulation of
companies holding 25 percent or more of the stock of two or more
commercial banks, was deliberately not made applicable to companies
owning only one bank. There was no need at that time to cover one-bank
holding companies. Beginning in 1968, the situation changed markedly.
Banks themselves, including many of the largest banks, began to form one-
bank holding companies in large numbers so that there are now more than
900 one-bank holding companies controlling about 40% of all commercial
bank deposits. . . . Under existing law, there are no restrictions upon
acquisitions by the newly formed one-bank holding companies, nor are
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amend the BHCA to apply to one-bank holding companies. Interest
groups and trade associations, like the IBAAl25 and the National
Association of Insurance Agents,126 also played a large role in
pushing for this amendment. 2 1
there any prohibitions on the activities in which they may engage, except, of
course, that they may not engage in the securities' business. The proposed
Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 ... would rebuild the wall separating
diverse economic interests. Under the legislation: The Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956 would be amended to extend Federal regulation of
bank holding companies to those companies which control one bank.").
123 1970 Hearings, supra note 121, at 168 (Statement of Frank Willie,
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) ("The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation believes that the activities of one-bank holding
companies should be brought promptly under effective regulatory control at
the Federal level in order to prevent an unhealthy concentration of the
Nation's economic resources and to control possible anticompetitive
practices in the allocation of credit and financial services within the
Nation's economy.").
124 Sax & Sloan, supra note 27, at 1210 n.70 (quoting Statement of
President Richard Nixon, March 24, 1969) ("The strength of our economic
system is rooted in diversity and free competition. The strength of our
banking system depends largely on its independence. Banking must not
dominate commerce or be dominated by it. To protect competition and the
separation of economic powers, I strongly endorse the extension of Federal
regulation to one-bank holding companies, and urge the Congress to take
prompt and appropriate action."). See also Recent Changes in the Structure
of Commercial Banking, 56 FED. RESERVE BULL. 199, 200 (1970)
(discussing one-bank holding company statistics and motivations); R. D. III,
supra note 74, at 952 n.4 (1969).
125 1970 Hearings, supra note 121, at 986 (Statement of Rod L. Parsch,
President, Independent Banks Association of America) ("Concentrated
control of banking in giant holding company and branching systems is a
constant threat to these objectives [preserving competition]. Therefore, our
association consistently favors any legislation designed to regulate and
control bank holding companies. . . .").
126 The one-bank holding company structure had become vital to the
preservation of small banks in some areas, notably the Midwest, as it
allowed individuals to purchase majority stakes in small community banks.
See 1970 Hearings, supra note 121, at 687 (Statement of J. Rex Duwe,
President, Farmers State Bank) ("In purchasing these banks ... we found it
necessary to borrow substantial sums of money. The repayment of these
debts would have been impossible had we acquired the banks
individually.... However, by using the one-bank holding company
arrangement . . . , repayment is possible over quite a period of years."). In
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On the other side of the debate, advocates of the one-bank
holding company structure argued that it strengthened the
competitiveness of the banking system by allowing banks to adapt
better to the changing market conditions and to take advantage of
economies of scale.128 Not surprisingly, this fight over the role of
one-bank holding companies reignited the broader debate over the
proper scope of bank holding company regulation in the United
States. 129
After two years of intense struggle, the multitude of forces
lobbying for eliminating the one-bank holding company exemption
prevailed.13 0 In 1970, Congress significantly amended the original
language of the BHCA to bring one-bank holding companies within
the scope of the BHCA.131 According to the Senate Committee's
order to use the one-bank holding company form, however, at least forty
percent of the holding company's adjusted gross income had to be derived
from sources other than bank dividends. As a result, many of these one-bank
holding companies satisfied this requirement through the use of an insur-
ance agency. The competition that this gave independent insurance agents
threatened to put many out of business. See 1970 Hearings, supra note 121,
at 461 (statement of Morton V. V. White, Vice Chairman, National
Association of Insurance Agents, Inc.) ("I cannot overstate our concern for
the effect that bank holding companies can have upon the livelihood of our
members and the welfare of the insuring public when bank holding
companies engage in the sale of insurance.").
127 This reflected a significant change in the landscape of the U.S. banking
industry by the early 1970s. In effect, local business elites and state bankers
had to give up their own ability to run commercial enterprise and own one
local bank, out of the fear of being swallowed by the large financial-
industrial groups.
128 See Sax & Sloan, supra note 27, at 1210 (stating that advocates "claimed
that holding companies were likely to yield economics of scale in
production, distribution, research and associated product development, and
management").
129 Sax & Sloan, supra note 27, at 1211.
" For a detailed analysis of the political struggle and Congressional
negotiations over that issue, see Abrams, supra note 63, at 108-144
(discussing the evolution of one-bank holding company legislation).
131 See Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
607, § 101(a), 84 Stat. 1760, 236 (1970) ("'[B]ank holding company' means
any company which has control over any bank . . . ."). One of the most
heated debates in Congress concerned the grandfathering clause for the
existing one-bank holding companies. Thus, the IBAA lobbied for a
provision that grandfathered only those one-bank holding companies that
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Report, the primary purpose of Congressional action was "to guard
against the possible future perpetration of abuses occasioned by a
company's unregulated control of a single bank." 132
The 1970 Amendments made several significant changes to
the BHCA.133 Importantly, Congress once again narrowed the scope
of the BHCA by amending the statutory definition of "bank." The
1970 Amendments added a second prong to the statutory test for
what constituted a "bank," requiring an institution to both accept
demand deposits and make commercial loans (essentially, loans for
were in existence in 1965, before the large banks began setting their con-
generic structures. That approach would have grandfathered mostly the
original one-bank holding companies that combined small local banks with
local commercial companies. On the other hand, the American Bankers
Association, representing the wider banking interests, argued for a 1969
grandfathering date. The ultimately adopted grandfathering clause permitted
one-bank holding companies to retain, for a ten-year period, activities law-
fully conducted as of June 30, 1968. This political compromise benefitted a
substantial swath of one-bank holding companies owning both small and
large banks. See Sax & Sloan, supra note 27, at 1215-16 (outlining
arguments by proponents and detractors of the grandfathering clause);
Abrams, supra note 63, at 123-124 (describing the positions taken by
lobbying groups). One study found the total deposits of one-bank holding
companies in existence by the end of 1968 dwarfed those of registered
BHCs:
During the eighteen months ending December 31, 1968,
approximately seventy-five commercial banks organized
one-bank holding companies. Included in the number
were seven of the nation's ten largest institutions. Their
total deposits of some $100 billion dwarfed the $51 billion
held by registered bank holding companies.
Eccles, supra note 60, at 101.
132 S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 4 (1970).
33 For instance, Congress deliberately expanded the scope of the BHCA by
revising the definition of "control." Under the 1970 Amendments, if a
company "directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over the
management or policies of the bank," the Federal Reserve could simply
designate the company as a BHC, even if it did not own twenty five percent
or more of a class of voting securities or control the election of directors.
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, §
101(a), 84 Stat. 1760, 1760 (1970). The 1970 Amendments also relaxed the
original statutory standards for permissible non-banking activities of BHCs
and added the anti-tying provisions that continue to exist today.
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business rather than personal purposes) in order to fall within the
BHCA's definition.13 4
According to the legislative history, by narrowing the
definition of a "bank," Congress sought to further ensure that the
BHCA applied only to companies controlling commercial banks and
not financial institutions that did not make commercial loans and
made only consumer loans.135 While Congress did not explicitly
define a commercial bank as one that made exclusively commercial
(as opposed to personal) loans, it was understood that the concerns
underlying the BHCA, notably fears of anticompetitive behavior,
were mainly targeted at banks that provided credit to businesses
rather than individual consumers. The Federal Reserve held a similar
view, noting that "there [was] less need for concern about prefer-
ential treatment in extending credit where no commercial loans
[were] involved."136
134 The 1970 Amendments redefined the term "bank:"
"Bank" means any institution organized under the laws of
the United States, any State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, any territory of the United States,
Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the Virgin
Islands which (1) accepts deposits that the depositor has a
legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the
business of making commercial loans.
Id. § 101(c).
135 S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 24.
136 1970 Hearings, supra note 121, at 137 (Letter from J. L. Robertson,
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System). This emphasis on preventing
excessive concentration of commercial, as opposed to consumer, credit
raises an interesting question, especially in light of the financial crisis of
2007-09 that originated in residential mortgage markets. On its face, the
focus on commercial lending may be viewed as reflecting the importance of
assuring fair access to credit for productive economic activity as one of the
underlying policy concerns driving the U.S. bank regulation. However,
there were probably important market factors that explained policy-makers'
exclusive preoccupation with potential conflicts of interest and other evils of
monopoly in the commercial credit market. It may very well be that
Congress considered consumer credit markets inherently diverse, localized,
and comprising a large number of small lenders, including thrifts, credit
unions, industrial banks and other entities. It is also possible that, in the
1950s and 1960s, commercial borrowers were particularly concerned about
having access to bank credit because it was the main source of loan
financing.
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At the time the 1970 Amendments were passed, the BHCA's
new definition of a bank was thought to have little effect, as most of
the institutions that were considered banks under the BHCA were,
indeed, in the business of making commercial loans.137 In fact, there
is evidence that the 1970 Amendments were deliberately designed to
exempt only one company from the definition of a bank: the Boston
Safe Deposit and Trust Company.1 3 8 The Boston Company was a
holding company that owned one of the oldest fiduciary banks in the
nation, the Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company, which
"maintain[ed] no commercial bank department" and was "primarily
engaged in the fields of investment and property management and
... other fiduciary services usually identified with the personal trust
business." 139 As it did not operate a commercial bank, the Boston
Company strongly urged Congress to exempt it from the BHCA, a
move that the Federal Reserve agreed to in 1970 by adding the
"commercial loan" prong to the definition of a bank. 14 0
137 Davis W. Turner, Note, Nonbank Banks: Congressional Options, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1740-41 (1986) (explaining that "critics argue that the
1970 amendments were designed to benefit only one company[,]" relying
"on statements made during the debate on the amendment indicating that
Boston Safe [Deposit and Trust Company] was virtually the only bank at the
time that did not make commercial loans"). See also Harvey N. Bock,
Opportunities for Nonbanking Companies to Acquire Depository Institu-
tions in the Wake of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, 44 Bus.
LAW. 1053, 1056 (1989) ("[T]he [1970] amendment was viewed as techni-
cal in nature and as having only very limited application.").
138 Turner, supra note 137, at 1740. See also Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking,
Fin, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong. 14 (1985) (statement of Paul A.
Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
("As you know, the present Bank Holding Company Act has been amended
through the years to define a bank as an institution that both accepts demand
deposits and makes commercial loans. I think in practice that was done to
exempt some very limited purpose institutions, specifically trust companies,
but as time has passed, as technology has changed, it is that particular
definition which is being exploited, such that a very large volume of
ordinary banking business potentially can be done in the guise of a
nonbank.").
139 1966 Hearings, supra note 69, at 732 (Letter from William W. Wolbach,
President, The Boston Co.).
140 See Executive Session: Tuesday, June 23, 1970, Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 10 (1970) ("On the first, in
regard to engaging in the business of making commercial loans, we have
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The 1970 Amendments' use of a conjunctive test in defining
a bank had a significant, and largely unforeseen, practical impact on
the development of the U.S. banking industry in the next seventeen
years. In effect, it created a significant new opportunity for
regulatory arbitrage, whereby a company could establish a so-called
"nonbank bank" and effectively offer banking services without
becoming a BHC. Functionally, these nonbank banks were very
much like regular commercial banks. They had bank charters but did
not fall within the scope of the BHCA's definition of "bank" because
they restricted their activities to either accepting demand deposits or
making commercial loans.141 Since, as a technical matter, these
companies did not own what the BHCA defined as banks, they were
not subject to the interstate or activity restrictions imposed by the
BHCA. Control of these nonbank banks potentially enabled financial
and commercial companies to offer a wide variety of banking and
received a report again from the Federal Reserve Board saying there is no
objection to this particular provision; that it would probably only affect one
institution located in the State of Massachusetts; and this is a trust company
in Boston which just incidentally finds itself brought under the definition of
a bank holding company without some provision such as this. And the Fed
agrees there is no real reason this particular outfit should be regulated.");
Executive Session: Tuesday, July 7, 1970, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 293 (1970) ("The first commercial loan
exemption was tentatively agreed to earlier by the Committee, and deals
with the Boston Trust Company situation that would otherwise be held a
bank holding company, but is not really engaged in the business of banking.
The Federal Reserve Board has seen no reason to deem them a bank holding
company, and it is suggested this would be the way to exempt them from
provisions of the Act.") (emphasis added).
141 For a discussion of the factors leading to the rise of nonbank banks and
the desirability of possessing a nonbank bank, see Bock, supra note 137.
See also William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future: Life
Without Glass-Steagall, 27 CATH. U. L. REv. 281, 291-96 (1988) (discus-
sing the "technological, economic, and competitive forces [that shifted]
financial markets away from traditional banking channels toward increased
use of the securities markets for financial intermediation."); CATHERINE
ENGLAND, CATO INST., CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS No. 85:
NONBANK BANKS ARE NOT THE PROBLEM 4-5 (1987) (discussing in detail
the economic and technological changes that had occurred in the financial
services industry).
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non-banking products and services, generally impermissible for
BHCs, on an effectively nationwide basis.142
During the 1970s, relatively few companies sought to take
advantage of the nonbank bank opportunity.143 But the situation
drastically changed in the turbulent 1980s. As one commentator
explains,
What could not be foreseen in 1970 was the drama-
tic rise in interest rates that later in the decade,
together with rapid technological changes and
greatly increased international competition, was to
cause enormous turmoil in the nation's financial
marketplace and a major restructuring of the finan-
cial services industry. One of the consequences of
those developments was a new interest in the
acquisition of depository institutions by companies
whose other activities did not qualify them for bank
ownership under the BHCA. The 1970 redefinition
of the term "bank" provided such companies with
precisely the means they needed to surmount that
obstacle.144
It was not until the 1980s, when commercial firms, securities
firms and insurance companies began acquiring FDIC-insured
nonbank banks, that the nonbank bank model appeared to pose a
serious threat to the separation of banking and commerce and
prohibitions on interstate banking. 14 5 The statutory definition of
142 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation
and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin, and Urban Affairs, supra note
138, at 88 (statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System) ("[T]hese financial organizations may ...
expand their primary financial services, such as securities, insurance, or real
estate services, on a nationwide basis whereas the primary activities of
banking organizations may not be so expanded.").
14' Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REv. 1539, 1569 (2007) ("During the 1970s, few
other institutions [besides the Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company]
sought to take advantage of this 'nonbank bank loophole."').
144 Bock, supra note 137, at 1056 (footnote omitted).
145 See Wilmarth, supra note 143, at 1569 ("[C]ommercial conglomerates,
securities firms and insurance companies acquired FDIC-insured banks in
the 1980s and caused those banks to stop engaging in one of the designated
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"bank" allowed these commercial companies to gain direct access to
federally-insured retail deposits that served as a cheaper source of
financing because of the public subsidy. 146
Companies from a wide variety of industries acquired
nonbank banks: retailing giants such as Sears' 47 and J.C. Penney;
financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch and Prudential Bache
Securities; insurance companies such as Aetna Life and Casualty
Company; and conglomerates such as Gulf & Western.14 8  The
majority of nonbank banks that arose during the 1980s took demand
deposits and made consumer loans, but did not make commercial
loans. By 1987, more than two hundred nonbank banks had been
established, with over two hundred additional applications for
nonbank banks pending. 149 The reasons for acquiring nonbank banks
at this time were similar: Gulf & Western, for example, used its
nonbank bank to facilitate its credit card and consumer lending
services, while Merrill Lynch used its nonbank bank to move check
and credit card transaction processing in-house.150 Regulated BHCs
also used nonbank banks in order to operate deposit-taking facilities
without violating interstate branching restrictions. 151
functions, thereby avoiding regulation under the BIC Act By 1987, two
major retailers-Sears and J.C. Penney and many other large commercial
firms owned FDIC-insured 'nonbank banks."').
146 U.S. depository institutions receive what amounts in practice to a
significant public subsidy through their access to federal deposit insurance
and the Federal Reserve's backup liquidity facilities and payment system.
Because their creditors consider them less risky, access to this federal safety
net lowers the cost of borrowing for insured depository institutions. Banks
receive this public subsidy because they perform important public utility
functions. See, e.g., E. GERALD CORRIGAN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNE-
APOLIS, ANNUAL REPORTS 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/arl982a.cfm.
147 Greenwood Trust Company of Delaware, Sears' nonbank bank, was the
fastest growing bank in 1986, increasing its deposits from $27 million to
$1.05 billion within the span of a year. ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD
BANKS Do? 49 (1987).
148 Id at 49; ENGLAND, supra note 141, at 2.
149 Id at 4.
150 Id at 2.
151 F. JEAN WELLS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IB87071, NONBANK BANKS 2
(1987); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision,
Regulation and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin, and Urban Affairs,
supra note 138, at 94 (statement of James G. Cairns, Jr., American Bankers
Association).
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C. The Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
As the number of companies seeking to exploit the nonbank
bank model increased, the same actors that historically had cham-
pioned regulation of bank holding companies increased pressure on
Congress to remedy the situation and restore the competitive status
quo ante.152
The Federal Reserve was a particularly important force in the
political battle against nonbank banks. Vehemently opposing the
establishment of nonbank banks, it actively lobbied Congress to
revise the statutory definition of "bank."1 53 The Federal Reserve's
open animosity toward nonbank banks reflected its belief that these
institutions were used deliberately to avoid restrictions on interstate
expansion and to combine banking with impermissible commercial
activities, thus gaining an unfair advantage over regulated banks. 5 4
The Federal Reserve also viewed the rapid growth of nonbank banks
operated by commercial companies as a significant threat to the
efficacy of its monetary policy. 55
In the early 1980s, the Federal Reserve denied applications
to form nonbank bank subsidiaries, which led to contentious
litigation.1 5 6 In 1984, the Federal Reserve took the dramatic step of
redefining the terms "demand deposit" and "commercial loan" by
regulation.' 5 The revised Regulation Y expanded the definition of
"demand deposit" to apply to all deposits that were effectively
payable on demand,1 5 8 including negotiable order of withdrawal
152 See generally Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision,
Regulation and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin, and Urban Affairs,
supra note 138.
i5, See Turner, supra note 137, at 1746 ("The Board consistently has
opposed the widespread establishment of nonbank banks and has lobbied
heavily for a change in the definition of 'bank'.").
154 d.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g, Wilshire Oil Co. v. Bd. of Governors, 668 F.2d 732 (3rd Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1132 (1982) (holding that "[t]he BHC Act was enacted to
prevent the possibility of a holding company abusing its control over
commercial bank credit for the benefit of its non-banking operations. . . .").
i57 Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Revision of
Regulation Y, 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 818 (Jan. 5, 1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
Part 225).
158 Id. at 818. The revised Regulation Y defined deposits that a depositor
had a legal right to withdraw on demand as "any deposit with transactional
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("NOW") accounts.' 59 Similarly, the definition of a "commercial
loan" was also broadened to include a wide variety of investments in
money market instruments. 1o The Federal Reserve argued that these
revisions were necessary in order to "carry out the purposes and
prevent evasion of the [BHCA]."l61
In short order, the Federal Reserve's revisions to Regulation
Y were challenged in court.162 In a landmark 1986 decision, Board of
Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., the Supreme Court of the
United States invalidated the Federal Reserve's actions as exceeding
its authority to interpret the statute. 1 The Court held that the
statutory language made clear that NOW accounts could not be
capability that, as a matter of practice, is payable on demand and that is
withdrawable by check, draft, negotiable order of withdrawal, or other
similar instrument . . . ." Id.
159 NOW accounts are interest-bearing savings accounts on which drafts
may be written. Because the deposit-taking institution reserves the legal
right to require notice before funds may be withdrawn, NOW accounts
technically do not constitute "demand deposits." NOW accounts were first
offered in Massachusetts in 1972 and quickly became popular as a means by
which savings banks and other types of financial institutions could compete
with the transfer services and third-party payment options offered by
commercial banks. See generally P. James Riordan, Negotiable Orders of
Withdrawal, 30 Bus. LAW. 151 (1974). In 1981, NOW accounts were
authorized on a national level for commercial banks, savings associations
and mutual savings banks. PAUL R. WATRO, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
CLEVELAND, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY: THE BATTLE FOR NOWs (1981).
160 See Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Revision of
Regulation Y, 49 Fed. Reg. at 818 (The Federal Reserve redefined a
"commercial loan" as "any loan other than a loan to an individual for
personal, family, household, or charitable purposes, and includes the
purchase of retail installment loans or commercial paper, certificates of
deposit, bankers' acceptances, and similar money market instruments, the
extension of broker call loans, the sale of federal funds, and the deposit of
interest-bearing funds.").
161 Id. at 798-99.
162 See Turner, supra note 137, at 1749-53 (detailing the holdings in several
federal cases).
163 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) ("The [BHCA] may be imperfect, but the
Board has no power to correct flaws that it perceives in the statute it is
empowered to administer. Its rulemaking power is limited to adopting
regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed in the
statute.") (footnote omitted).
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defined as "demand deposits," regardless of actual practice. 6 4
Similarly, the Court struck down the Federal Reserve's decision to
include commercial loan substitutes in the statutory definition of
"commercial loan" as impermissibly altering the common meaning
of the term as used in the financial services industry.165 While noting
that there were possibly good policy reasons to regulate nonbank
banks, the Court stressed that the statutory definition reflected the
political compromise reached in Congress and that altering that
definition required an act of Congress.166
Independent and community banks, which had historically
benefitted from interstate banking and branching restrictions, were
also adamant that Congress close the nonbank bank option. During
congressional hearings in 1985 on the issue of nonbank banks, the
IBAA was strongly supportive of legislation designed to stop the
creation of further nonbank banks and pushed against the inclusion of
any grandfathering clauses in the legislation.167 The insurance
industryl 68 and the small business community1 6 9 also actively lobbied
for the amendments to the BHCA.
164 See id. at 368 ("Institutions offering NOW accounts do not give the
depositor a legal right to withdraw on demand; rather, the institution itself
retains the ultimate legal right to require advance notice of withdrawal. The
Board's definition of 'demand deposit,' therefore, is not an accurate or
reasonable interpretation of § 2(c) [of the BHCA].").
165 See id. at 373 ("Nothing in the statutory language or the legislative
history, therefore, indicates that the term 'commercial loan' meant anything
different from its accepted ordinary commercial usage. The Board's defini-
tion of 'commercial loan,' therefore, is not a reasonable interpretation of §
2(c) [of the BHCA].").
i66 d. at 374.
i67 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation
and Ins. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin, and Urban Affairs, supra note
138, at 110 (statement of Charles T. Doyle, President-Elect, Independent
Bankers Association of America) ("We believe that this bill should not
grandfather any nonbank banks . . . . Those who sought nonbank bank char-
ters knew what they were taking-at that time, a significant legal risk-
when they established those institutions. We do not think that Congress
should bail them out with any kind of grandfather clause.").
i6s Id. at 346 (letter from Roger N. Levy, Vice-President of Government
Affairs, Independent Insurance Agents of America) ("[W]e support commit-
tee approval of H.R. 20 to close the non-bank bank loophole .. .").
169 Id. at 316 (Statement of Small Business Legislative Council and the
National Small Business Association) ("[We] support [] H.R. 20 and your
efforts to close the non-bank loophole.").
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Faced with pressure from the Federal Reserve and increasing
uncertainty surrounding the continuing legal status of nonbank
banks, Congress considered amending the BHCA during its ninety-
eighth and ninety-ninth sessions.o As the controversy grew,
however, members of Congress could not agree on the proper scope
of the amendments and whether to aim for more comprehensive
reform than simply closing the nonbank bank possibility."' When it
became clear that broader reforms were not feasible at the time,
Congress passed the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
("CEBA") as a stopgap measure, which amended the BHCA's
definition of a bank for a third time. 72
Under the CEBA definition, which remains in force today,
an institution is considered a "bank" for the purposes of the BHCA,
if it is either (1) an FDIC-insured institution, or (2) an institution
that accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans.174 As a
170 Mary Jo Wetmore, Note, Banking and Commerce: Are They Different?
Should They Be Separated? 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 994, 1007 (1998).
171 Id. at 1007-08.
172 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101,
101 Stat. 552, 554 (1987). It is important to note that CEBA was not passed
primarily in response to the controversy surrounding the nonbank bank
phenomenon. The main impetus for the passage of CEBA was the need to
recapitalize the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Company ("FSLIC"),
which had suffered great losses during the S&L crisis of the 1980s. See
infra note 302 and accompanying text. The term "competitive equality"
refers to competitive equality between thrifts, or savings associations, and
banks.
173 The FDIC insurance scheme covers all deposit accounts, including
savings accounts, checking accounts, money market savings or checking
accounts, and certificates of deposit. See FDIC Insurance Coverage Basics,
FDIC.Gov, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insured/basics.html (last
visited on Nov. 12, 2011). Investment accounts and investment products-
such as mutual funds, stocks, bonds and annuities-are not insured by the
FDIC. Currently, FDIC deposit insurance covers up to $250,000 per
depositor, per insured bank and per account ownership category. Before
2008, the ceiling was $100,000. Insured Deposits, FDIC.GOv, http://www.
fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/insured/ownership.html (last visited on Nov. 6,
2011).
174 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 § 101(a)(1); see also S. REP.
No. 100-19, at 29 (1987) ("This section redefines the term "bank" to
include an FDIC-isured [sic] institution whether or not it accepts demand
deposits or makes commercial loans. The new definition also includes non-
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result, all FDIC-insured institutions that had enjoyed "nonbank bank"
status under the 1970 Amendments became "banks" under the
CEBA, unless grandfathered.
In addition to closing the possibility for regulatory arbitrage
through the use, or abuse, of the nonbank bank form, CEBA also
included explicit exemptions from the definition of "bank" for
certain specific categories of financial institutions, including
industrial loan corporations, credit card banks, limited purpose trust
companies, credit unions and savings associations (or thrifts).176 As a
practical matter, all of these institutions had previously been
exempted-albeit not explicitly-from the BHCA's definition of a
bank.177 However, CEBA solidified and gave a firm legal footing to
their status as institutional alternatives to banks and, accordingly,
potential forms of entry into the market for banking services by the
non-banking and commercial entities that control them. 1
FDIC insured institutions that both accept demand deposits or transaction
accounts and are engaged in the business of making commercial loans.").
17 CEBA included a provision that grandfathered existing nonbank banks.
See Bock, supra note 137, at 1057 ("Congress did not attempt to stuff the
genie entirely back in the lamp, however; section 101(c) of CEBA grand-
fathered companies that controlled nonbank banks on March 5, 1987,
subject to significant limitations on those companies and their banks.").
176 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (2006). This is not an exhaustive list of the explicit
exemptions from the definition of a bank under CEBA. For the purposes of
this Article, we will only be looking at the five exemptions listed. Other
institutions that are currently exempted include:
(A) A foreign bank which would be a bank within the
meaning of [the BHCA] solely because such bank has an
insured or uninsured branch in the United States[;] ...
(C) An organization that does not do business in the
United States except as an incident to its activities outside
the United States[; . . . and]
(G) An organization operating under section 25 or section
25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act.
Id. § 1841(c)(2).
17 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 § 101(a)(1).
17 One broad category of financial institutions that did not make it into the
coveted list of explicit CEBA exemptions-but nevertheless continued to
enjoy their implicitly exempt status-is a diverse group of finance com-
panies, including various consumer and mortgage lenders. These institutions
have always remained outside the BHCA definition of a bank because they
do not finance their operations through demand deposits, instead raising
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IV. Who Is Out? Exemptions from the Definition of "Bank"
under the BHCA
This Part examines the evolution and practical impact of the
five principal exemptions from the definition of "bank" under the
BHCA: industrial banks and industrial loan corporations, credit card
banks, limited purpose trust companies, credit unions and savings
associations. These financial institutions were, despite their
differences, consistently exempted from the statutory definition-at
first, implicitly and, after 1987, explicitly-based on the same policy
rationale. Thus, at every juncture between the passage of the BHCA
in 1956 and the enactment of CEBA in 1987, these institutions were
viewed as relatively small local institutions with a specialized focus
and limited range of activities, centering primarily on consumer
financial services.
A. Industrial Loan Corporations
Industrial banks and industrial loan corporations (collectively
referred to as "ILCs") began in the early twentieth century as "small,
state-chartered loan companies that primarily served the borrowing
needs of industrial workers unable to obtain non-collateralized loans
from banks." 179 At the time, commercial banks focused primarily on
serving the financial needs of businesses and were largely unwilling
to provide loans to low- and moderate-income individuals, typically
funds primarily in capital markets. In 1987, long before the markets for
mortgage-backed securities ("MBSs") and collateralized debt obligations
("CDOs") dramatically altered the role and risk profile of these institutions,
Congress did not appear to believe they posed an appreciable risk from the
perspective of the BHCA's policy objectives. Ironically, however, it was
these financial institutions that significantly contributed to the implosion of
the global financial system twenty years later. For example, before its
demise in the fall of 2008, Lehman Brothers used two mortgage-lending
subsidiaries to originate the bulk of its mortgage assets for in-house
securitization. Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, at 44, In re Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010).
179 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-621, INDUSTRIAL LOAN
CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST
HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 1, 5 (2005)
[hereinafter the 2005 GAO REPORT].
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industrial workers.'so ILCs emerged as a new type of financial
institution catering to this growing but underserved market,
functioning as a new form of financial self-help for working-class
borrowers with stable jobs but no access to credit.'8 ' Initially, many
ILCs did not accept any deposits and funded themselves instead by
issuing investment certificates. 182
As commercial banks expanded their consumer lending
business and gradually took over that segment of the market, they
forced ILCs and industrial banks to redefine their business focus. 8 3
One hundred years after its birth, an ILC effectively "reemerged as a
way for commercial and financial firms to offer banking services
without being subject to the ownership restrictions and parent
company supervision that typically apply to other companies owning
depository institutions."1 8 4 As a result of this transformation, by the
mid-2000s, the ILC industry has evolved from a collection of "small
niche lenders" into a distinct sector comprising some of "the nation's
largest and more complex financial institutions." 85 The key factor
driving this functional transformation was the special exempt status
180 See Kenneth Spong & Eric Robbins, Industrial Loan Companies: A
Growing Industry Sparks a Public Policy Debate, 2007 FED. RESERVE
BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REv. 41, 42-43 (2007). Industrial banks filled a
void in the banking market:
This market developed because commercial banks were
generally unwilling to offer uncollateralized loans to
factory workers and other wage earners with moderate
incomes. Much of the early success of industrial banks
can be attributed to Arthur J. Morris, who chartered the
first ILC in 1910 and established the basic framework for
Morris Plan banks. Morris Plan banks spread to over 140
cities by the early 1930s and became the leading providers
of consumer credit to lower-income workers.
Id. at 42-43 (footnote omitted).
181 See JAMES R. BARTH & TONG Li, MILKEN INSTITUTE, INDUSTRIAL LOAN
COMPANIES: SUPPORTING AMERICA'S FINANCIAL SYSTEM 11 (2011)
(explaining that instead of relying on collateral, these new financial institu-
tions extended loans on the basis of "recommendations from creditworthy
individuals who knew the [borrower]").
182d.
183 Spong & Robbins, supra note 180, at 43.184 [d.
185 2005 GAO REPORT, supra note 179, at 1.
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that ILCs-and, accordingly, business entities that control them-
received under the BHCA.
It is not apparent that Congress ever intended to include ILCs
in the universe of "banks" whose corporate owners had to be
regulated as BHCs. In 1956, ILCs were not included in the BHCA's
original charter-based definition of a bank. Moreover, ILCs effect-
tively continued to be exempt from the revised definitions of "bank"
under both the 1966 and 1970 Amendments, primarily because they
did not accept demand deposits, within the meaning of the statute. 86
Since the 1970s, however, many ILCs offer NOW accounts that are
functionally similar to demand deposits.'7 There are also a number
of ILCs that are non-depository in nature, and thus do not offer any
transaction account services.1 Some ILCs, but not all, are also
engaged in commercial lending, as well as real estate and consumer
lending. 89
To be eligible for the CEBA exemption from the BHCA
definition of "bank," an ILC must either not engage in any activity it
was not lawfully engaged in as of March 5, 1987,190 or it must be
chartered in a State that required ILCs to be FDIC-insured as of
March 5, 1987, and meet one of the following criteria: (1) not accept
86 In fact, the definition of "bank" in thel966 Amendments was designed
specifically to exempt ILCs, along with certain other institutions. S. REP.
No. 89-1179, at 7 (1966) ("To avoid this result, the bill redefines 'bank'
[sic] as an institution that accepts deposits payable on demand (checking
accounts), the commonly accepted test of whether an institution is a
commercial bank so as to exclude institutions like industrial banks and
nondeposit trust companies."). Even before the 1966 Amendments, the
Federal Reserve, in an interpretive ruling, indicated that it did not consider
ILCs to be "banks" within the meaning of the BHCA, as they did not accept
demand deposits and therefore did not constitute commercial banks. 1966
Hearings, supra note 69, at 157 (statement of Ralph L Zaun, President,
Indep. Bankers Ass'n).
87 2005 GAO Report, supra note 179, at 6 ("[M]any ILCs offer Negotiable
Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts-similar in some respects to demand
deposits and are, therefore, able to offer a service similar to demand
deposits without their holding companies being subject to supervision under
the BHC Act."). For a description of NOW accounts, see id.
88 BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 57 (see Figure 25: from the sample of
ILCs surveyed, it seems that a majority of ILCs are non-depository).
189 Id. (see Figure 25 for data on the loan composition of ILCs).
190 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(c)(2)(H)(ii) (2006).
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demand deposits; (2) have total assets of less than $100 million; or
(3) have been acquired prior to August 10, 1987.191
The first prong of the CEBA exemption effectively grand-
fathered the exempt status for ILCs existing at the time of its
enactment but froze their permissible activities on a going-forward
basis. The second prong of the statutory test exempts any FDIC-
insured ILC, as long as it meets one of the three requirements. These
three requirements were presumably designed to exempt ILCs that
did not function as commercial banks (in that they did not take
demand deposits); ILCs that were not economically significant (with
assets less than $100 million); or ILCs that could not provide
commercial or financial companies a means to acquire a nonbank
bank (by forbidding changes in ownership after the date of the
CEBA's enactment). Thus, the most important practical effect of the
statutory language, as added by the CEBA, was to allow ILCs with
FDIC-insured retail deposits to remain outside the definition of a
bank, as long as none of their deposits qualified technically as
"demand deposits." Since 1987, this exemption has not been
amended.
The need for an explicit exemption for ILCs arose as a result
of the interplay between the CEBA and an earlier piece of banking
legislation, the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982
(the "Garn-St Germain Act"), which made deposits taken by ILCs
eligible for FDIC insurance.192 In response to the Garn-St Germain
Act, several states-notably, California, Colorado, Hawaii and
Utah-enacted laws requiring all locally chartered deposit-taking
ILCs to obtain federal deposit insurance. 19 3 Political pressure from
these states to have Congress exempt such FDIC-insured ILCs from
the newly expanded definition of "bank" was evident in CEBA's
legislative history.194 Thus, CEBA exempts ILCs from the definition
of a "bank" if the ILC is chartered in a state that, as of March 5,
1987, had in effect or under consideration a law mandating their
ILCs to obtain FDIC insurance for their deposits. As of 2010, only
six states had active ILC charters, with most ILCs chartered in
Utah.
191 Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H)(i).
192 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, § 703(a), 96 Stat. 1469, 1538 (1982).
193 BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 4.
194 130 Cong. Rec. 24,966 (1984) (statement by Sen. Matsunaga).
195 BARTH& LI, supra note 181, at 14. Few states currently charter ILCs:
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At the time of CEBA's enactment, congressional under-
standing was such that ILCs would not be used by large commercial
companies to offer banking services to their commercial custo-
mers.196 By and large, ILCs were still small, state-chartered financial
institutions that had limited deposit-taking powers and engaged
primarily in making consumer loans to low- and middle-income
individuals. 19 7 Total ILC assets in 1987 were $4.2 billion, and the
largest ILC had assets of only $420 million.198 Compared to
commercial banks and trust companies, which at the time held $3.5
trillion in assets, ILCs were a minor player in the U.S. financial
system. 199
In more than three decades since the passage of the CEBA,
the ILC industry has undergone considerable changes. To enhance
the value of their ILC charters, state authorities gradually increased
ILC powers to the extent where ILCs can essentially function like
In the early years of the ILC industry, at least 40 states
chartered or licensed depository and/or non-depository
ILCs. During the past decade, however, this number
declined to seven states. And as of mid-2010, only six
states still had active FDIC-insured ILCs. This situation is
due to the enactment of the Competitive Equality Banking
Act (CEBA) of 1987. CEBA specifies that only ILCs
chartered in states that had in effect or under consideration
a statute requiring ILCs to be FDIC-insured as of March
5, 1987, were exempt from the definition of "bank" in the
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA). This means that
only ILCs chartered in "grandfathered" states, as deter-
mined by the Federal Reserve, are eligible for the ILC
exemption from the BHCA. Until 2009, there were seven
such states, but the last ILC in Colorado became inactive
that year. There are currently only six grandfathered states
with active depository ILCs.
Id. In addition to Utah, states chartering ILCs include California, Nevada,
Hawaii, Minnesota and Indiana. Some states, such as California, have
enacted laws prohibiting commercial ownership of ILCs. In California, this
law was adopted after Wal-Mart attempted to acquire an ILC there. All
commercially-owned ILCs are located in either Utah or Nevada. See Spong
& Robbins, supra note 180, at 43.
196 Wilmarth, supra note 143, at 1572-73.
197 id.
198 id.
199 Id.; see also BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 2 (comparing the holdings
of lLCs with other financial institutions).
162 Vol. 31
THAT WHICH WE CALL A BANK
FDIC-insured state-chartered banks, offering a full range of banking
services.200 An explicit exemption from the BHCA definition of a
bank made ILCs a particularly attractive option for securities firms
and other non-bank financial institutions, as well as commercial
companies that sought access to lending and deposit-taking.20 1
Notably, General Motors was the first commercial company to
acquire an ILC charter in 1988, shortly after the enactment of CEBA
that closed the nonbank bank loophole.20 2 In many respects, ILCs
have become a post-CEBA version of a nonbank bank.203
Although ILCs continued to be dwarfed by commercial
banks and other depository institutions in terms of the sheer numbers
200 Spong & Robbins, supra note 180, at 43 ("ILCs, for instance, can
generally engage in a full range of consumer and commercial credit
operations and other standard banking activities.").
201 While many ILCs originated as small, community-based stand-alone
institutions, the majority of currently active ILCs are owned and operated by
a corporate parent-either a financial institution or a commercial enterprise.
See BARTH & Li, supra note 181, at 16 (providing summary data on major
ILCs and their parent holding companies). Before the recent crisis, financial
ILC parent companies, included securities firms (UBS, Goldman Sachs,
Lehman Brothers), credit card companies (American Express Company,
Advanta Corporation) and insurance companies (United States Automobile
Association, Well Point, Inc.). Id. at 51.
202 See The FDIC's Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: Historical
Perspective, FDIC.GOV, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/
supervisory/insights/sisum04/industrial loans.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2011); see also BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 16 ("Throughout the
industry's history, most ILCs were either stand-alone entities or their
parents were financial firms. In 1988, however, General Motors acquired an
ILC charter.").
203 Financially-owned ILCs continue to dominate commercially-owned ILCs
with respect to both the number of ILCs and total assets. In 2010,
financially-owned ILCs accounted for eighty-six percent of total assets and
roughly three quarters of all ILCs between 2000 and 2010. Id. at 18. As of
2010, the two largest financially-owned ILCs American Express
Centurion Bank (owned by American Express) and UBS Bank USA (owned
by UBS AG)-controlled about $30 billion in total assets each, while the
largest commercially-owned ILC-BMW Bank of North America, owned
by BMW AG-had only $8.2 billion in total assets. Id. at 20-24 (see Table
2 and Table 3).
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and size,204 the ILC industry experienced rapid growth in its total
asset base and increased concentration.205 This trend has become
especially pronounced in the decade preceding the financial crisis of
2007-09. Thus, in 1998, there were roughly ninety ILCs controlling
$28.6 billion in total assets.206 Total assets tripled in the span of two
207years to $92.6 billion in 2000. From 2000 to 2005, total assets
steadily increased by approximately $10 billion each year, reaching
$160.9 billion in 2005, spread over approximately ninety-six ILCs.208
From 2005 to 2007, the ILC industry experienced tremendous
growth: while the number of ILCs did not change dramatically, total
assets shot up from $160.9 billion in 2005 to $219.9 billion in 2006,
and then to a staggering all-time high of $270.3 billion in 2007.209
Most of this growth was the result of a small number of
"securities firms converting the cash management accounts held by
their clients into insured ILC deposits." 210 This allowed securities
firms, in effect, to get cheaper financing of their activities and to
develop formidable in-house lending capability to support their
traditional securities underwriting and dealing and investment advice
204 As of 2010, ILCs accounted for approximately 0.5% of total insured
institutions, and one percent of total insured deposits and total assets of
insured institutions. BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 14.
205 See BARTH & Li, supra note 181, at 11-15. According to that study,
ILCs grew rapidly after the 1930s, eventually reaching a
high of 254 institutions with $408 million in assets in
1966 (still relatively small when compared to more than
13,000 commercial banks with $403 billion in assets in
that same year). After 1966, the number of ILCs declined
steadily to 130 in 1977, before increasing again to 155 in
1983. Once again, the number then declined, falling to 78
ILCs in the second quarter of 2010. In terms of total
assets, ... ILCs grew sharply from $3.8 billion in 1983 to
$9 billion a decade later and eventually an all-time high of
$270 billion in 2007, before declining to $122 billion in
the second quarter of 2010. (This decline was almost
entirely due to some fairly large ILCs converting to bank
charters in response to the financial crisis.)
Id. at 13.
206 BARTH & Li, supra note 181, at 78 (Appendix 4).207 d
208 d
209 d
210 Spong & Robbins, supra note 180, at 46.
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business. Ownership of ILCs allowed securities firms to become a
one-stop-shop for all of their customers' financing and investment
needs, significantly increasing their profitability and permitting them
to compete more successfully with commercial banks. Indirectly, it
also contributed to the growth of available credit outside the
traditional banking system.2'
Thus, before the latest crisis, the largest ILC was Merrill
Lynch Bank USA with assets of $78.1 billion in 2007." Merrill
Lynch Bank USA was first established in 1988 and became inactive
in 2009 following Bank of America's takeover of Merrill Lynch.2 13
During the run-up to the crisis, Merrill Lynch Bank USA's total
assets steadily increased. From 2000 to 2007, its total assets grew
214from $43.2 billion to $78.1 billion2. The second largest ILC before
the financial crisis was Morgan Stanley Bank.215 Morgan Stanley
Bank was established in 1990, and became inactive in 2008 when it
211 This Article does not argue that there was a direct and tangible link
between the activities of ILCs owned by Wall Street investment banks and
the financial crisis of 2007-09. It is difficult to corroborate such a claim
without further research, which merits a separate treatment. Nevertheless,
the ability of large investment banks to utilize the federal subsidy to
increase the volume and scope of their de facto banking activities was an
important trend in the pre-crisis development of the U.S. financial sector.
212 As an ILC, Merrill Lynch Bank USA offered a variety of deposit
accounts, including money market deposit accounts, certificates of deposit,
individual retirement accounts and market participation certificates. By the
end of 2008, Merrill Lynch Bank USA's total assets fell from $78.1 billion
to $61 billion (with an all-time low of $58 billion in mid-2008). See Spong
& Robbins, supra note 180, at 48 (concluding that the rapid growth of
Merrill Lynch Bank can be attributable to its decision to "[sweep] balances
out of cash management accounts at the brokerage subsidiary and into
MLB, thereby providing brokerage customers with deposits insured up to
$100,000 at rates competitive with, or even exceeding, money market
mutual funds. This practice is typical of ILCs owned by securities firms.");
MERRILL LYNCH BANK USA, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/MER/0x0x275905/7353c968-dOe6-
4080-bO6d-5eab26f24706/ MLBUSA Annual Report 2008_final.pdf.
213 BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 81. Following the takeover, it converted
to a commercial bank charter. Id. at 45.
214 Merrill Lynch Bank USA, FDIC.GOv, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.
asp (Find FDIC Certificate # "27374"; then follow "Generate Report"
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
215 BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 51.
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216
converted to a bank charter. Its total assets in 2000 were $1.9
billion, which grew to $8.7 billion in 2005, then jumped to $21
billion in 2006, and finally reached $35.1 billion before the crisis.217
The third largest ILC before the crisis was Ally Bank
(formerly GMAC Automotive Bank), owned by General Motors. 218
Ally Bank was established in 2004 and converted into a commercial
bank charter in 2009.2 19 Ally Bank reported total assets of $1.2
billion in 2004, a number that jumped to $20 billion in 2006 and then
to $28.4 billion in 2007.220 It exemplified a typical commercially-
owned ILC, which served primarily to finance purchases of the
commercial parent's products. 221 In 2006-07, however, the bulk of
Ally Bank's assets were residential mortgages and related assets. 222
This shift in the business profile of Ally Bank reflected a larger trend
toward financialization of the U.S. economy in the pre-crisis era,
when large manufacturing and other commercial companies derived
an increasingly high share of their profits from providing various
financial services, often through their ILC subsidiaries.2 23
216 Id. at 81. This conversion was part of the reorganization of Morgan
Stanley as a BHC in the midst of the rapidly unfolding financial crisis.
217 Id. at 51. These numbers raise potentially interesting questions about the
pre-crisis uses of the ILC charter by big investment banks. As noted above,
however, answering these questions would require additional research and is
beyond the scope of this Article.218 [d
219 Id at 81. This conversion was a part of the crisis-driven reorganization of
GMAC as a BHC.
220 Ally Bank, FDIC.Gov, http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp/main.asp (Find FDIC
Certificate # "57803"; then follow "Generate Report" hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 14, 2011). Following the crisis, Ally Bank continued to report
increases in total assets: between 2008 and 2011, total assets grew from
$32.9 billion to $72.5 billion. Id.
221 Thus, Ally Bank provided financing for consumers purchasing GM cars
from the dealers, as well as so-called floor financing for GM dealerships.
Other automotive companies, such as Toyota, BMW, and Harley-Davidson,
also used their ILCs in a similar fashion. See Spong & Robbins, supra note
180, at 52.
222See id. (stating that, in 2007, $13.4 billion out of $16.4 billion in Ally
Bank's total loans consisted of residential mortgages).
223 GMAC's aggressive move into residential mortgage lending and trading
of mortgage-backed securities was one of the causes that led it to the brink
of failure and the federal bailout of GM and GMAC in 2009. See CONG.
OVERSIGHT PANEL, THE UNIQUE TREATMENT OF GMAC UNDER THE TARP
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Interestingly, the greatest political controversy over comer-
cial ownership of ILCs was not related to the transformation of
household names like General Motors or General Electric into
financial service providers. It arose in 2005, when the retail giant
Wal-Mart attempted to form a Utah-chartered ILC.224 The primary
activity of Wal-Mart's proposed ILC was to "act as a sponsor for the
processing and settlement of credit card payments, debit card
payments, and check payments made by customers at Wal-Mart
stores."2 25 Yet, the public outcry that resulted was unprecedented.226
39-41 (2010), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname 110 senate hearings&docid f:54875.pdf.
224 This was not the first time that Wal-Mart had attempted to enter the
banking industry. On June 29, 1999, Wal-Mart applied to acquire an
Oklahoma federal savings association. This attempt was later blocked by the
GLBA, which closed the unitary thrift holding company possibility that
Wal-Mart had sought to use. See Zachariah J. Lloyd, Waging War with Wal-
Mart: A Cry for Change Threatens the Future of Industrial Loan
Corporations, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 211, 223-24 (2008) ("Wal-
Mart commenced its quest to own a bank in June 1999 when it applied to
purchase a small thrift in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma named the Federal Bank
Center."); Kevin Nolan, Wal-Mart's Industrial Loan Company: The Risk to
Community Banks, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 187, 191 (2006) ("Wal-Mart's
first attempt to enter banking was an effort to purchase a small thrift
institution named Federal BankCenter in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma."). On
September 10, 2001, Wal-Mart entered into an agreement with TD Bank, by
which TD Bank would offer banking products and services in Wal-Mart
stores. This plan was eventually blocked by the OTS, which objected to
Wal-Mart's plan to share the profits with TD Bank and to have its retail
store employees perform banking transactions for TD Bank in its Wal-Mart
stores. Id In April 2002, Wal-Mart tried to purchase a $2.5 million
California-chartered industrial bank named Franklin Bank. The California
legislature quickly responded to this by enacting a law prohibiting non-
financial institutions from acquiring state-chartered industrial banks, with
certain exceptions. Id.at 192; Riva D. Atlas, Wal-Mart is Seeking Approval
to Buy a California Bank, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002, at C9.
225 Wilmarth, supra note 143, at 1541-42, 1544; see also Nolan, supra note
224, at 189 ("Wal-Mart processes about 140 million transactions a month,
roughly $288 billion in sales for 2004 . . . . The transaction costs that would
be saved from processing its own Visa and MasterCard credit and debit
transactions are estimated to be around $650 million.").
226 In response to its invitation for public comments on Wal-Mart's
application, the FDIC received approximately 13,800 comment letters, most
of which vehemently opposed the idea. Lloyd, supra note 224, at 229.
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In response to widespread opposition from community bankers,227
the Federal Reserve, labor unions, retail stores and members of
228Congress, the FDIC placed a six-month moratorium on Wal-
Mart's application and all other pending applications to obtain
federal deposit insurance for ILCs. This moratorium was later
extended for an additional year, but only with respect to applications
by commercial firms for ILC ownership. Ultimately, on March 16,
2007, Wal-Mart withdrew its application for an ILC bank charter.229
227 Interest group pressure from community bankers was critical in pre-
venting Wal-Mart from acquiring an ILC. One commentator described the
sources of concern about Wal-Mart establishing an ILC:
Wal-Mart's possible foray into the world of ILCs has
caught the attention of many trade organizations such as
the Independent Community Bankers of America, the
United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, the National Grocers Association, and the National
Association of Convenience Stores. These groups believe
that if Wal-Mart charters an ILC, and the charter is later
expanded to include full retail banking services, it would
put many businesses at substantial risk, in particular small
community banks. The approval of an ILC for Wal-Mart
could significantly compromise the status of community
banks and upset the historic separation in our economy
between banking and commerce.
Nolan, supra note 224, at 187-88.
228 The widespread fear at the time was that Wal-Mart would eventually
expand its banking services after the initial three-year period. ILCs are
bound to its original business plan for the first three years. Afterwards, an
ILC may seek permission to amend its charter and expand its business into
full-service banking. Thus, it was conceivable that Wal-Mart, if permitted to
acquire an ILC, could engage in full-service banking and establish
additional branches in other states in a matter of years. See Lloyd, supra
note 224, at 225-26; Nolan, supra note 224, at 189-90 (concluding that the
chief concern was the Wal-Mart would launch an expanded business plan
within a few years after receiving charter approval).
229 Wal-Mart appears to have found other methods of engaging in banking
activities. On June 20, 2007, Wal-Mart unveiled its plan to open
"MoneyCenters" in its stores, which are financial services centers that allow
customers to cash checks, pay bills and obtain prepaid Visa cards. See
generally Jonathan Birchall, Walmart Extends its Banking Interests, FIN.
TIMES (June 16, 2010), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/71f9ec4e-78b4-l ldf-
a312-00144feabdcO.html?dbk# axzzldtrqamjt; Charles Kabugo-Musoke,
Consumer Focus: A Walmart Owned ILC: Why Congress Should Give the
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Even before the Wal-Mart ILC controversy, members of
Congress had attempted to pass legislation to block commercial
companies from owning depository institutions.230 The financial
crisis of 2007-09 pushed that issue to the background of the political
debate. The crisis also fundamentally altered the landscape of the
ILC industry, as many ILCs, including the three largest ones, closed
or converted to commercial banks.2 3 1 Nevertheless, commercial
ownership of ILCs remains a potentially controversial matter.232
B. Credit Card Banks
Credit cards function as a form of typically unsecured
revolving loan.233 They did not exist when the BHCA was enacted in
Green Light, 15 N.C. BANKING INST. 393 (2011) (examining in detail Wal-
Mart's efforts to offer financial services).
230 Lloyd, supra note 224, at 231-32. In March 2004, the House of
Representatives backed an amendment sponsored by Representatives
Barney Frank and Paul Gillmor, as part of the proposed Financial Services
Regulatory Relief Act, which sought to prohibit interstate branching by
ILCs that were owned by commercial firms. The amendment did not gain
support in the Senate and was never enacted into law. Id. In 2006,
Representatives Frank and Gillmor proposed another bill, the Industrial
Bank Holding Company Act, to impose reporting requirements on ILC
holding companies, and to prohibit commercial control of ILCs. Id After
failing to make it out of committee in 2006, the bill emerged again in 2007,
but also failed to gamer enough support. Id.
231 BARTH & Li, supra note 181, at 45. In 2007, the total assets of the five
largest ILCs stood at $192.7 billion; in 2010, the figure was $90.4 billion.
Id at 51.
232 Today, many commercially owned ILCs are in the automotive industry,
with parents companies like Toyota, BMW and Harley-Davidson. Other
commercial companies with ILCs include GE, Target and Fry's Electronics.
BARTH & LI, supra note 181, at 67.
233 Credit Cards Activities Manual, FDIC.Gov, http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/examinations/credit card/ch2.html (last updated June 12, 2007).
Card issuers make money per credit card transaction, called an "interchange
fee", that is roughly two percent of the transaction charge. Adam J. Levitin,
The Credit Card Industry's Business Model Encourages Irresponsible
Lending, CREDITMATTERSBLOG.COM (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.credit
mattersblog.com/2008/12/credit-card-industrys-business-model.html. They
typically fund their credit card activities through a process of securitization,
whereby the credit card debt is transformed into "a pool of assets used to
pay off bonds." Id.
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1956.234 In 1966, Bank of America introduced the general-purpose
credit card by creating the BankAmerica Service Corporation, which
franchised the BankAmericard brand to other banks.235 In the same
year, a group of banks established a national credit card system now
known as MasterCard Worldwide.236 These developments effectively
created the modern credit card industry.
BHCs have historically used specialized credit card banks to
"seek relief from onerous usury restrictions" in their home state. 23 7
Because credit card banks were not considered "banks," establishing
credit card banks in states with favorable usury laws did not violate
interstate banking restrictions or the Douglas Amendment of the
BHCA.23 Thus, the creation of credit card banks allowed their parent
BHCs to engage in lucrative interest rate arbitrage: by locating itself
in a state with favorable or no usury laws, a credit card bank could
set interest rates above the rates that its parent BHC could set in its
home state. Moreover, a 1978 Supreme Court case, Marquette
National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 239
permitted credit card banks to "export nationally whatever interest
rate was allowed in the state in which they were headquartered."240
This interest rate would apply to customers nationwide, even if it
exceeded the interest rate cap in the customer's home state. This led
a number of states, such as South Dakota and Delaware, to adopt
234 See Emily Starbuck Gerson & Ben Woolsey, The History of Credit
Cards, available at http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-
cards-history-1264.php (stating that the first credit card with a revolving
balance was produced in 1959).
235 Id. (quoting Stan Sienkiewicz, Credit Cards and Payment Efficiency 4
(August 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.
philadelphiafed.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion-
papers/2001/PaymentEfficiency_092001.pdf)).236 d
237 Anita Boomstein, Credit Card Banks Get Back to Basics, 4 CREDIT
CARD MGMT. 24, 25 (1991). Usury laws specify the maximum interest rate
that can be charged for different types of loans. These laws function as a
form of consumer protection aimed at preventing abusive lending practices.
238 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
239 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
240 Pat Curry, How a Supreme Court Ruling Killed off Usury Laws for
Credit Card Rates, CREDITCARDS.COM (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.
creditcards.com/credit-card-news/marquette-interest-rate-usury-laws-credit-
cards-1282.php.
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very liberal (or not have any) usury laws.24 1 This ability to take
advantage of favorable usury laws in specific states is one of the key
reasons for the continuing existence of specialized credit card
banks.242
Since credit card banks did not exist in 1956, Congress could
not have intended to include them within the BHCA's original
definition of a bank. Beginning with the 1966 Amendments,
however, credit card banks were implicitly exempted from the
definition of a bank, because they did not accept demand deposits. 24 3
In 1987, CEBA explicitly excluded credit card banks from the
BHCA's definition of a bank, subject to certain limitations. 2 44 Under
CEBA, an institution qualifying for the credit card bank exemption
must (1) engage only in credit card operations; (2) not accept demand
deposits; (3) not accept any savings or time deposit of less than
$100,000, unless they are used as collateral for extended credit card
loans; 2 45 (4) maintain only one office that accepts deposits;246 and
241 id
242 In addition, there may be important funding and operational reasons for
regulated BHCs to maintain specialized credit card banks. Concentrating all
of the group's credit card assets in a single corporate entity may make it
easier to securitize such assets. For a thorough discussion of the special
nature of credit card loan securitization, see Adam J. Levitin, Skin-in-the-
Game: Risk Retention Lessons from Credit Card Securitization, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). For an earlier study of the profitability
of specialized credit card banks, see Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr. & Robert C. Nash,
Assessing the Riskiness and Profitability of Credit-Card Banks, 7 J. FIN.
SERV. RES. 127, 127 (1993) (arguing that specialized credit card banks,
defined as institutions with at least three-quarters of their assets in credit
cards and related plans, "earned extraordinary accounting returns over [the]
sample period 1984 to 1991").
243 The 1970 Amendments continued to exempt credit card banks because
they neither accepted demand deposits nor made commercial loans (only
consumer loans). Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-607, §101(c). 84 Stat. 1760, 1762 (1970).
244 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)(1988).
245 Originally, CEBA's exemption prohibited credit card banks from
accepting deposits of less than $100,000 for any purpose. In 1996, Congress
added the proviso allowing exempted credit card banks to hold such
deposits as collateral. Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork
Reduction Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §2304(b), 110 Stat. 3009-345, 3009-
425 (1996). It appears that, by prohibiting credit card banks from accepting
demand deposits and time deposits of less than $100,000, Congress intended
to prevent credit card banks from shifting their primary operations to
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(5) not engage in the business of making commercial loans. 24 7 In
effect, the statutory exemption restricts the deposit-taking capability
of credit card banks and prevents them from expanding their
248
activities beyond the traditional credit card loan business. As long
as credit card banks limited their activities to consumer credit card
operations and did not stray into making commercial loans, they
would not be considered commercial banks subject to the regulations
of the BHCA.249
CEBA exempted credit card banks from the BHCA defini-
tion of a bank primarily because these institutions offered very
limited and highly specialized consumer financial services and did
not pose the risk of monopolizing commercial credit markets. This
exemption has been largely uncontroversial and rarely, if ever,
challenged. Part of the explanation here may be the fact that these
specialized institutions, which emerged after the BHCA was adopted,
did not create significant competitive frictions within the financial
services industry. Thus, an archetypal credit card bank that meets the
CEBA exemption requirements is a specialty institution affiliated
with a commercial company, often a retailer, and offering that
company's customers private label or co-branded credit cards. More-
over, credit card banks owned or controlled by BHCs are already
subject to the "umbrella" supervision by the Federal Reserve.2 In
addition, under the Dodd-Frank Act, credit card banks are also
subject to direct regulatory oversight by the newly created Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection ("CFPB").
accepting deposits. Deposits accepted by certain credit card banks, chartered
as limited purpose national banks or thrifts, are eligible for FDIC insurance.
246 The word "office" refers only to deposit-taking offices and does not limit
offices engaged in "back-room activities typically associated with a credit
card operation." H.R. REP. No. 261, at 121 (1987).
247 12 U.S.C. § 184 1(c)(2)(F).
248 H. REP. No. 99-175, at 11 (1985).
249 S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 24.
250 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
251 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1091, 124 Stat. 1376, 2094 (2010). In recent years, high
charges and fees associated with credit cards and other questionable credit
card industry practices became the subject of intense political controversy
that led to the enactment of the Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility,
and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat.1734 (2009). It is
unclear what impact, if any, these issues will have on the continuing
existence and operation of CEBA credit card banks.
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C. Limited Purpose Trust Companies
Trust companies generally engage in the business of holding
and managing money in a fiduciary or representative capacity, and
their specific permissible activities largely depend on the applicable
state statutes. Under CEBA, institutions functioning solely in a trust
or fiduciary capacity252 are explicitly exempt from the BHCA's
definition of a bank, if the following requirements are met: (1) all or
substantially all of the deposits are in trust funds and are received in
a bona fide fiduciary capacity; (2) no FDIC-insured deposits of such
institution are offered or marketed by or through an affiliate; (3) such
institution does not accept demand deposits; and (4) the institution
does not obtain payment or payment-related services from any
Federal Reserve Bank or exercise Federal Reserve discount or
- - *253borrowing privileges.
A "trust company" was explicitly included within the origin-
nal BHCA's definition of a bank.254 However, the 1966 Amendments
effectively exempted from that definition trust companies that did not
accept demand deposits. 255 In fact, the legislative history of the 1966
Amendments indicates that Congress specifically intended to exclude
"non-deposit trust companies."256 Under the 1970 Amendments, such
limited purpose trust companies remained outside the scope of the
statutory definition of a bank, because they did not accept demand
deposits or make commercial loans. Thus, long before CEBA made
the exemption explicit, these types of limited-service fiduciary
institutions were deliberately excluded from the universe of "banks"
and, accordingly, allowed entities that owned or controlled them to
257
escape regulation as BHCs. The rationale behind this exemption is
252 According to the accompanying Conference Report, "trust or fiduciary
capacity" "includes serving as trustee, executor, custodian, administrator,
registrar of stocks and bonds, guardian of estates, or committee of estates of
incompetents." H.R. REP. No. 100-26 1, at 120 (1987).
253 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(D) (2006).
254 Bank Holding Company Act, Pub. L. No. 84-511, §2(c), 70 Stat. 133,
133 (1956).
255 S. REP. No. 89-1179, at 7 (1966).
256 Id.
257 For example, securities firms often acquired limited purpose trust
companies in order to diversify their product offerings and level the playing
field with trust companies that aggressively moved into the securities
business. Regulated BHCs also used limited purpose trust companies to
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based on the notion that the fiduciary and trust services performed by
limited purpose trust companies do not constitute a strictly "comer-
cial banking" activity.258
D. Credit Unions
Credit unions are not-for-profit financial cooperatives owned
by their member-customers.25 9 Their principal purpose is to provide
deposit-taking and lending services exclusively for their members
rather than the general public. 260 Credit unions engage in a limited set
of financial activities tailored to consumer credit needs of their
261
members2. Credit unions can be federally or state chartered, and
their deposits are insured.262 Federal credit unions are regulated by
establish additional locations through which trust services can be provided,
without running afoul of interstate banking restrictions.
258 In fact, the Federal Reserve explicitly included the operation of a limited
purpose trust company in its list of non-banking activities permissible for
BICs under Regulation Y in 1987. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(c)(3) (1987)
("Unless the Board finds that the trust is being operated as a business trust
or company, a trust is presumed not to be a company .... ).
259 NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION, NCUA FACT SHEET 2
(2011), available at http://www.ncua.gov/NewsPublications/quick facts/
Facts2007.pdf.
260 Nicholas Ryder & Clare Chambers, The Credit Crunch: Are Credit
Unions Able to Ride Out the Storm?, 11 J. BANKING REGULATION 76, 76
(2009).
261 For more details on the activities of credit unions, see William R.
Emmons & Frank A. Schmid, Credit Unions and the Common Bond, 81
FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LouIs REV. 41 (1999). According to their study:
Credit unions play a limited role in the U.S. financial sys-
tem, catering to the basic saving, credit, and other finan-
cial needs of well-defined consumer groups. More than 95
percent of all federal credit unions offer automobile and
unsecured personal loans, while a similar proportion of
large credit unions (more than $50 million in assets) also
offer mortgages; credit cards; loans to purchase planes,
boats or recreational vehicles; ATM access; certificates of
deposits; and personal checking accounts.
Id at 43.
262 Frequently Asked Questions, NCUA.Gov, http://www.ncua.gov/
Resources/Cnsmrs/Pages/FAQ.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (stating that
174 Vol. 31
THAT WHICH WE CALL A BANK
the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA") and insured by
the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund ("NCUSIF").263
Similar to ILCs and thrifts, credit unions were originally
264formed to serve the credit needs of the working class2. Membership
criteria for credit unions began with the use of the "common bond"
265
requirement, which first arose in 1914. In 1934, the Federal Credit
Union Act (the "FCUA") stated that credit union membership was to
be limited to groups having a "common bond of occupation or
association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, com-
munity, or rural district." 2 66 The idea behind the common bond
requirement is that "credit worthiness is evaluated on the basis of
knowledge that the members have of each other." 267 In 1982, the
NCUA loosened the common bond requirement to "broaden credit
union access to groups that were too small to support a viable credit
union."268 By the late 1990s, "the demographic characteristics of
credit-union members have become more like the median
American."26 9
Congress has consistently treated credit unions and banks as
different categories of institutions. The enactment of the FCUA in
1934 was based on Congress's belief that credit unions were "mutual
or cooperative organizations operated entirely by and for their
members," and thus meaningfully different from banks. 0 In 1937,
charter numbers are assigned based on the categories of federal, federally
insured state-chartered and non-federally insured).
263 Id. State-chartered credit unions are regulated by an agency of the
chartering state, but must also report to the NCUA if they are federally
insured. Id Currently, there are fewer than 500 non-federally insured state-
chartered credit unions that do not report to the NCUA. These non-federally
insured state-chartered credit unions are located in Alabama, California,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Nevada, Ohio and Puerto Rico. Id.
264 See Ryder & Chambers, supra note 260, at 77. Following the Great
Depression and the subsequent loss of faith in commercial banks, credit
unions became an extremely popular banking alternative. Id.
265 Id at 80.
266 Federal Credit Union Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, § 9, 48 Stat. 1216, 1219
(1934).
267 Ryder & Chambers, supra note 260, at 80.
268 See id at 81. In 1982, the NCUA "permitted federal credit unions to
expand their membership . . . to include multiple unrelated employer
groups." BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 23, at 91.
269 Emmons & Schmid, supra note 261, at 43.
270 H. REP. No. 75-1579 at 2 (1937).
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Congress' decision to make credit unions tax exempt was also based
on the view that credit unions were not the same as commercial
banks.27 In 1998, Congress reiterated its belief in the distinction
between credit unions and commercial banks in the Credit Union
Membership Access Act.2
In light of this congressional view, it is unsurprising that
credit unions were exempted from the definition of "bank" under the
BHCA. Credit unions did not satisfy the original charter-based
definition in 1956 because of their mutual form of ownership. They
continued to be implicitly exempted from the statutory definition
under both functional tests in the 1966 and the 1970 Amendments to
the BHCA, as they did not accept demand deposits or make
commercial loans.273 In 1987, CEBA simply made the exemption for
credit unions from the BHCA's definition of a bank explicit.274
Credit unions continue to be restricted in their lending
authority. Credit unions may only lend to credit union members,
other credit unions and credit union organizations. 5 Credit unions
271 id.
272 Congress explained the key differences between credit unions and
commercial banks:
Credit unions, unlike many other participants in the finan-
cial services market, are exempt from Federal and most
state taxes because they are member-owned, democratic-
ally operated, not-for-profit organizations generally man-
aged by volunteer boards of directors and because they
have the specified mission of meeting the credit and
savings needs of consumers, especially persons of modest
means.
Credit Union Membership Access Act, Pub. L. No. 105-219, § 2(4), 112
Stat. 914, 914 (1998).
273 With regard to the inability of credit unions to make commercial loans
during this period of time, see La Caisse Populaire Ste. Marie (St. Mary's
Bank) v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 512, 517 (D.N.H. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.
2d 505 (1st Cir. 1977) ("The Federal Credit Union Act limits the loans
which can be made and the assets which can be held by an institution
chartered under its auspices. The most important limitation is that a credit
union may only make loans to its members. Congress has also strictly
limited the authority of credit unions to make long-term, real estate and
other loans.").
274 Competitive Equality Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, §101,
101 Stat. 554. 554 (1987).
275 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5) (2006).
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are allowed to make commercial loans to members, but the net loan
balance is limited to the lesser of 1.75 times the credit union's actual
276
net worth or 12.25% of the credit union's total assets. In the wake
of the recent financial crisis, some credit unions started to grow their
commercial lending business. Credit unions also offer checking
and savings accounts and credit card services.
The total number of credit unions has decreased in the last
few decades, falling from a peak of 23,687 credit unions in 1970 to
7,605 credit unions at the end of 2010.278 At the same time, the
number of credit union members has steadily increased each year
since 1950; by the end of 2010, there were over 92 million credit
union members. 279 Total assets of credit unions have also steadily
increased, from $17.8 billion in 1970 to over $934 billion as of
December 2010.280 In terms of the relative size of the industry, at the
end of 2010, credit union assets made up three-quarters of total
FDIC-insured savings institution assets and approximately eight
percent of total FDIC-insured commercial bank assets.281
In general, consumer-owned credit unions emerged relatively
282
unscathed from the recent financial crisis2. Both total assets and
membership levels increased during the crisis.283 However, so-called
276 Id. § 1757a(a); 12 C.F.R. § 723.16 (2005); see also BROOME &
MARKHAM, supra note 23, at 116. See generally Magazine, Forbes blog in
Favor of Increased CUMBL, CREDIT UNION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (June
23, 2011), http://www.cuna.org/newsnow/11/system062211-14.html (dis-
cussing recent efforts to raise the member business lending (MBL) caps to
27.5% of assets from the current level of 12.5%).
277 Adam Belz, Credit Unions Growing Commercial Lending Business,
USA TODAY (July 10, 2011, 3:57 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
money/industries/banking/2011-07-11-credit-unions-small-business n. htm.
278CREDIT UNION NAT'L Ass'N, CREDIT UNION REPORT: YEAR-END 2010 7
(2010), available at http://www.cuna.org/research/download/curepdl0.pdf
[hereinafter, 2010 CUNA CREDIT UNION REPORT].
279 id
280 Id In 2010, the asset growth rate of 3.3% was the slowest since the
1940s, but still remained considerably higher than the asset growth rate for
FDIC-insured banks, which stood at 1.9%. Id. at 4.
281 Id at 5.
282 Linda Eagle, Banker's Academy Briefings: The Impact of the Financial
Crisis on Credit Unions, BANKER'S ACADEMY I (Sept. 30, 2010),
http://bankersacademy.com/pdf/Impact of Financial Crisis onCUs.pdf.
283 See 2010 CUNA CREDIT UNION REPORT, supra note 278, at 7. Between
June 2007 and June 2009, total assets steadily increased from $763.8 billion
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corporate credit unionS2 84 were "in imminent danger of insolvency"
due to an "over-concentration in what were once highly rated
mortgage-backed securities"285 and required government rescue.286
The exclusion of credit unions from the definition of "bank"
in the BHCA has been uncontroversial, primarily because of their
ownership structure, focus on consumer credit in localized markets,
and the existence of an alternative regime for their supervision and
regulation. As a result, credit union activities have not directly
triggered any major issues in the political struggles over interstate
branching and banking, concentration in commercial credit, or
287
separation of banking and commerce.
to $889.3 billion, and memberships increased from 89.1 million to 91.8
million. Id.
284 See NAT'L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., STABILITY THROUGH THE CRISIS:
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION 2008-2009 ANNUAL REPORT 6
(2009), available at http://www.ncua.gov/Resources/Reports/NCUA2008-
2009AnnualReportFINAL.pdf (referring to the "corporate credit union
system" as "the network of correspondent credit unions that provide
liquidity, payment systems, and investments for nearly 7,500 consumer-
owned credit unions.").
285 Id.
286 See Claude R. Marx, NCUA Files Another MBS Lawsuit, CREDIT UNION
TIMES (July 27, 2011), http://www.cutimes.com/2011/07/24/ncua-files-
another-mbs-lawsuit (reporting that after the NCUA took over five
corporate credit unions, including Southwest Corporate FCU, Members
United Corporate FCU, and Constitution Corporate FCU, the NCUA held
bonds once worth $50 billion). On May 20, 2009, Congress amended the
FCUA to create the Temporary Corporate Credit Union Stabilization Fund
("TCCUSF"). Helping Families Save Their Home Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-22, § 204(f), 123 Stat. 1632, 1651-53 (2009). The TCCUSF borrowed
funds from the Treasury Department, to be repaid with assessments on
federally insured credit unions over a period of seven years. WILLIAM
DESARNO, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, NAT'L CREDIT UNION ADMIN.,
OIG-11-01, MATERIAL Loss REVIEW OF MEMBERS UNITED CORPORATE
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 9 n.1 1 (May 4, 2011).
287 There is, however, a long history of economic competition between
credit unions and commercial banks in the markets for consumer financial
services, accompanied by a bitter political struggle over the expansion of
credit unions' "common bond" requirement, their tax-exempt status and
other issues. See generally Emmons & Schmid, supra note 261, at 42-45.
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E. Savings Associations
The first savings associations, or "thrifts," emerged in the
United States before the Civil War.288  Thrifts began as state-
chartered institutions whose purpose was to encourage savings and
help "persons belonging to a deserving class, whose earnings [were]
small, and with whom the slowness of accumulation discourage[d]
the effort ... to become ... owners of homesteads." 289 During the
Great Depression, a sizable fraction of these institutions failed,290
spurring the creation of a new regulatory regime for savings
institutions under the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933
("HOLA"). 2 9 ' Administered by the newly created Federal Home
Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB"), 29 2 this separate regulatory regime ran
parallel to the regulatory regime created for banks because of the
functional distinction that Congress had drawn between commercial
banks and thrifts, which focused on home mortgage lending and did
not engage in the general business of banking.2 93 The original HOLA
prohibited thrifts from accepting deposits or issuing certificates of
indebtedness and allowed them to "raise their capital only in the form
of payments on such shares as are authorized in their charter." 294 The
288 JULIE L. WILLIAMS & ScoTT ZESCH, ESQ., SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS:
MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND CONVERSIONS 1-4 [hereinafter WILLIAMS]
(Law Journal Press ed., 2010).
289 BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 23, at 73 (quoting Wash. Nat'l Bldg.,
Loan & Inv. Ass'n v. Stanley, 63 P. 489, 491-92 (Ore. 1901)).
290 Id. (stating that more than 1,700 of those institutions failed).
291 Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128
(1933).
292 Id. § 2(1). The FHLBB was created under the Federal Home Loan Bank
Act of 1932. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, § 3, 47
Stat. 725, 726 (1932).
293 See, e.g., La Caisse Populaire Ste. Marie (St. Mary's Bank), 425 F.
Supp. at 516 ("Savings and loan associations, in contrast with national
banks and other commercial banks, were formed by Congress: '[i]n order to
provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest their
funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes."); N. Arlington
Nat'l Bank v. Kearny Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 187 F. 2d 564, 567 (3d Cir.
1951).
294 Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 § 5(b) (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)).
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lending capacity of thrifts was also restricted primarily to secured
residential mortgages.29 5
The original charter-based definition of "bank" in the BHCA
explicitly included a "savings bank."2 9 6 As a practical matter,
however, control or ownership of thrifts rarely triggered regulation
under the BHCA, as most of these institutions at the time were held
in mutual form or through a unitary holding company.297 Under both
the 1966 and 1970 Amendments to the BHCA, thrifts generally did
not meet the functional test for a "bank" and thus were implicitly
exempted from the reach of the statute. Only in 1980, when federal
regulators started loosening traditional constraints on thrifts' business
activities in an ill-fated attempt to boost the sector's profitability,
were thrifts permitted to make commercial loans, issue credit cards
and offer NOW accounts. 298 In 1982, the Garn-St Germain Act
permitted thrift institutions to "raise capital in the form of such
295 See id § 5(c) ("Such associations shall lend their funds only on the
security of their shares or on the security of first liens upon homes or
combination of homes and business property within fifty miles of their
home office: Provided, That not more than $20,000 shall be loaned on the
security of a first lien upon any one such property; except that not exceeding
15 per centum of the assets of such association may be loaned on other
improved real estate without regard to said $20,000 limitation, and without
regard to said fifty-mile limit, but secured by first lien thereon: And
provided further, That any portion of the assets of such associations may be
invested in obligations of the United States or the stock or bonds of a
Federal Home Loan Bank.").
296 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(c), 70 Stat.
133, 133-134 (1956) ("'Bank' means any national banking association or
any State bank, savings bank, or trust company . . . . ") (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006)). The term "savings bank" referred to a
subset of thrifts different from savings and loan ("S&L") associations. The
first savings banks were established in 1816 in Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania, and accepted deposits in amounts less than one dollar. Until
recently, state-chartered savings banks existed only in seventeen
Northeastern states. No federal charter was available before 1978. BROOME
& MARKHAM, supra note 23, at 82.
297 Historical Framework for Regulation of Activities of Unitary Savings
and Loan Holding Companies, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION,
http://www.ots.treas.gov/ files/48035.html [hereinafter Historical Frame-
work] (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
298 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. 96-221, §§ 401-402, 94 Stat. 132, 151-156 (1980) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)).
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savings deposits, shares, or other accounts, for fixed, minimum, or
indefinite periods of time ... or in the form of such demand accounts
of those persons or organizations that have a business, corporate,
commercial, or agricultural loan relationship with the association"
and to issue "passbooks, time certificates of deposit, or other
evidence of accounts as are so authorized." 299 Thus, while thrift
institutions could not accept demand deposits in the same way that
commercial banks could, they could accept them from commercial
entities if they were in connection with a commercial loan
300relationship.30
Both the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980 ("DIDMCA") and the Garn-St Germain Act
were part of concerted legislative and regulatory efforts in the 1980s
to reverse the declining profitability of thrifts in the highly
competitive and volatile market environment. These deregulatory
measures, however, encouraged excessive risk-taking that ultimately
resulted in massive losses and failures of savings institutions during
the S&L crisis of the 1980s.3 1 In 1987, in response to the ongoing
crisis, Congress enacted CEBA, which authorized a $10.8 billion
recapitalization of the FSLIC and prescribed forbearance measures to
prevent or postpone closures of thriftS.3 02 As discussed above, CEBA
299 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. 97-320, § 312, 96
Stat. 1469, 1496-97 (1982) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464
(2006)).
300 Prior to the passage of the Garn-St Germain Act, mutual savings banks
had been permitted to accept demand deposits in connection with a com-
mercial relationship pursuant to the Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980. Depository Institutions Deregulation
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 408.
30o The S&L crisis had a profound effect on the entire thrift industry. See
generally DivisIoN OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES - LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE (1997), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/
history/index.html; The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography, FDIC.GOV,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/s&l/ (last updated Dec. 20, 2002).
302 George Hanc, The Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s:
Summary and Implications, in HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES-LESSONS FOR
THE FUTURE 3, 10 (1997) available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
historical/history/3_85.pdf. In 1989, Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),
which abolished the FHLBB and FSLIC, created the OTS, and established
the Resolution Trust Corporation to deal with failed assets. See generally
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amended the BHCA definition of "bank" and created an explicit
exemption from that definition for savings associations, which
- 303
remains in force today.
Historically, Congress has treated savings associations
differently from banks, distinguishing between the traditional savings
associations' focus on home mortgage lending and the more
expansive business-oriented services provided by banks. 304 in
enacting the 1966 Amendments, Congress recognized that the
objectives of the BHCA could be achieved without applying the
BHCA to "savings banks."os Legislation targeting thrift holding
companies has traditionally been aimed at "reinforcing the residential
and consumer lending mission of their subsidiary associations"
instead of "curbing the unrelated business activities of thrift holding
companies," which further highlights the distinction Congress has
306drawn between savings associations and banks.
The first piece of legislation to address thrift holding
companies directly was the Spence Act of 1959, which prohibited
existing holding companies from acquiring additional thrifts out of a
fear that local thrifts would be "swallowed up by interstate holding
company conglomerates."307 This moratorium was lifted by the
Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967
("SLHCA").308 The SLHCA prohibited thrift holding companies
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989); see also DAVID LAWRENCE
MASON, FROM BUILDINGS AND LOANS TO BAIL-OUTS: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY, 1831-1995 241-55 (2004).
303 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, § 101, 101
Stat. 552, 554 (1987) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006)).
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(B) (2006), "(1) any Federal savings associa-
tion or Federal savings bank; (2) any building and loan association, savings
and loan association, homestead association, or cooperative bank if such
association or cooperative bank is a member of the Deposit Insurance Fund;
and (3) any savings bank or cooperative bank which is deemed by the
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision to be a savings association
under section 1467a(l) of this title" is exempt from the BHCA's definition
of a "bank." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(j) (2006).
304 Historical Framework, supra note 297.
3o5 S. REP. No. 89-1179, at 7 (1966).
306 Historical Framework, supra note 297.
307 WILLIAMS, supra note 288, at 2-4.
308 OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, HOLDING COMPANIES IN THE THRIFT
INDUSTRY: BACKGROUND PAPER 4 [hereinafter OTS BACKGROUND PAPER]
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from "engaging in commercial and industrial enterprises, as well as
certain financial activities such as underwriting insurance or
securities."3 09 Importantly, the activity restrictions promulgated by
the SLHCA only applied to multiple thrift holding companies that
owned two or more thrifts and not to unitary thrift holding companies
that owned or controlled only one thrift.310
A significant change took place in 1987, when Congress
introduced the Qualified Thrift Lender ("QTL") test in CEBA."' The
QTL test was designed to make sure all thrifts held a minimum
percentage of their assets in qualified thrift investments.312 If a thrift
failed the QTL test, the holding company would subsequently be
313treated as a BHC. Failure of the QTL test would likely have an
enormous impact on most thrift holding companies, as "the confine-
ment of their unrelated business activities to those permissible for
bank holding companies . . . [meant the] forced sale of either the
subsidiary thrift or other profitable entities."3 14 Because BHCs are
not permitted to own non-banking interests, a thrift holding company
whose subsidiary thrift fails the QTL test would be required to divest
its non-banking interests to comply with the BHCA.3 " The FIRREA,
passed in the wake of the S&L crisis, enhanced the QTL test and
imposed stricter penalties for thrifts that failed the test.316
(1997). See generally Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1967).
309 OTS BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 308, at 4.
310 id.
311 Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-86, § 104(c),
101 Stat. 554, 571 (1987) (repealed 1989).
312 Id. Under CEBA, thrifts had to maintain at least sixty percent of their
total assets in "qualified thrift investments," which include primarily
residential mortgage loans and related assets. Id.
313 id.
314 Historical Framework, supra note 297.
315 See id. (recognizing that "[i]mplicit in the QTL test is a Congressional
determination that ownership of a single savings association by a firm
engaged in commercial activities does not raise the types of concerns
regarding the mixture of banking and commerce and the monopolization, or
discriminatory availability, of commercial credit that led to enactment of the
BHCA of 1956 and its extension to one-bank holding companies by the
BHCA Amendments of 1970.").
316 WILLIAMS, supra note 288, at 2-16. Under the FIRREA's QTL test, a
thrift must hold at least seventy percent of its assets in qualified
investments. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
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Importantly, however, unitary thrift holding companies were
treated differently from multiple thrift holding companies. Under the
original BHCA, unitary thrift holding companies were exempt from
the BHC registration requirement (as a thrift holding company would
have to own two or more "savings banks" in order to be considered a
BHC). 3 1 7 After the one-bank holding company option was closed,
thrift holding companies remained outside the scope of the BHCA to
the extent their thrift subsidiaries were exempt from the BHCA
definition of a "bank." Instead, thrift holding companies were subject
to the parallel regulatory regime under the SLHCA. The SLHCA
generally exempted unitary thrift holding companies from the activ-
ity restrictions imposed upon multiple thrift holding companies.3 18
These activity restrictions included prohibitions against engaging in
non-banking activities, certain financial activities (such as under-
writing insurance and securities), and activities not closely related to
the savings and loan industry.
As a result of this exemption, a commercial company could
become a unitary thrift holding company without running afoul of
either the SLHCA or the BHCA. This was a deliberate move by
Congress to encourage the acquisition of single thrifts by commercial
and financial companies.3 20 In the late 1990s, Ford Motor Company,
Sears Roebuck and Company, ITT Corporation and Weyerhaeuser
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 303, 103 Stat. 183, 344 (1989). The FIRREA
also narrowed the pool of qualified investments, but allowed thrifts to
double the value of certain investments for the purposes of the QTL test. Id.
Thrifts that failed the QTL test were required to obtain a bank charter and
their parent companies were required to register as BHCs one year after the
date of non-compliance. Id.
317 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(a), 70 Stat.
133, 133 (1956).
'18 See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
319 Kabugo-Musoke, supra note 229, at 397 (citing Joseph G. Haubrich &
Jodo A. C. Santos, Alternative Forms of Mixing Banking with Commerce:
Evidence from American History, 12 FIN. MARKETS, INST. & INSTRUMENTS
121, 144 (2003)); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 288, at 2-28 to 2-29
("Unitary holding companies generally were not subject to limitations on
activities of the holding company and its non-savings institution
subsidiaries; multiple holding companies and their non-savings institution
subsidiaries were confined to a statutory list of activities regarded as closely
related to the savings and loan business, augmented by a list of permissible
activities contained in regulations of the FHLBB.").
320 Historical Framework, supra note 297.
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Company were among the many commercial companies that owned
thrift institutions.
After the deposit insurance fund for thrifts was recapitalized
in 1996, applications to establish unitary thrift holding companies by
commercial companies increased significantly.322 Between 1997 and
1999, the OTS approved more than eighty applications for unitary
thrift holding companies, a substantial portion of which were from
retailers and other commercial firms. 323 By the end of October 1999,
shortly before the enactment of the GLBA, more than fifty additional
applications were pending before the OTS, which included Wal-
324Mart's proposal to acquire a thrift in Oklahoma. By the late 2000s,
most thrift holding companies were unitary, rather than multiple.3 25
In 1999, the GLBA expressly prohibited new holding com-
panies from owning a single savings association and a commercial
enterprise.32 6 Legislative history of the GLBA indicates that this
measure was due to the immense pressure from community banks
and trade associations, which argued that unitary thrift companies
enjoyed an unfair advantage over banks and presented a serious
321 OTS BACKGROUND PAPER, supra note 308, at 9.
322 Wilmarth, supra note 143, at 1584-85; see also id. at 1584 n.264 ("In
1989, Congress abolished the FSLIC and established within the FDIC two
separate deposit insurance funds- the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) for banks
and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) for thrifts. Many banks
subsequently acquired SAIF-insured deposits by purchasing thrift institu-
tions. In 1996, Congress required all thrifts and all banks holding SAIF-
insured deposits to pay a one-time special assessment to recapitalize the
SAIF. The recapitalization of SAIF greatly reduced the cost of future
deposit insurance premiums for thrift institutions and maintained the
credibility of deposit insurance for thrifts. In addition, Congress liberalized
the QTL by expanding the amounts of commercial and consumer loans that
would qualify for QTL treatment. Both measures made the thrift charter
much more attractive, especially for non-banking companies that were
barred from acquiring banks under the BHC Act.").
323Id. at 1584-85.
324 Id.
325 OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OTS HOLDING COMPANY HANDBOOK
§ 400.2 (2008).
326 Financial Services Modernization Act, Pub. L. 106-102, § 401, 113 Stat.
1338, 1434-36 (1999); see also WILLIAMS & ZESCH, supra note 288, at 2-17
(describing GLBA limitations imposed on holding companies, including
disallowing ownership of both a commercial enterprise and a savings
institution).
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danger to the principle of separation of banking and commerce.32
The Federal Reserve also supported the prohibition on commercial
activities of unitary thrift holding companies.32 8
Importantly, however, the GLBA grandfathered the exemp-
tion for the existing unitary thrift companies. 329 Thus, in the post-
GLBA era, only the grandfathered unitary thrift holding companies
retained their ability to engage in commercial activities, as long as
there was no change in their control. 3 30
In the period between the enactment of the GLBA and the
financial crisis of 2007-09, thrifts experienced a period of growth. In
2005, there were 484 thrift holding companies under OTS
327 See H.R. 10 - The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999:
Hearings before the Comm. on Banking and Financial Servs., 106th Cong.
42-43 (1999) (statement of R. Scott Jones, President, American Bankers
Association) ("For many banks and particularly community banks, the
unitary thrift issue is critical. The crux of the unitary thrift issue is whether
to mix banking and commerce. If Congress does not make a decision soon,
the marketplace will make it for us, and we will have permanently crossed
the bridge into full banking and commerce. For example, Microsoft could
buy a small thrift with their spare change, merge it with a large bank and run
the combined firm as a unitary thrift. While technically having a thrift
charter for all practical purposes, it would, of course, be a bank. And that is
the critical point. There is very little, if any, difference between a bank and a
thrift. However, there is a big difference in how their holding companies are
regulated.... By not dealing with the unitary thrift issue, Congress will
have blessed two parallel banking systems, one with a much stricter
regulatory standard than the other, and we know that basic economics tells
us the flow of capital will move to the lesser regulated entity."); id at 44
(statement of William L. McQuillan, President, Independent Bankers
Association of America (stating that the "unitary thrift holding company
loophole ... allows any commercial firm to get into the banking business by
buying a unitary thrift.").
328 Id. at 104 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System).
329 See Financial Services Modernization Act § 401 (stating that activity and
affiliation restrictions do not apply to existing unitary thrift holding
companies as long as they were a thrift holding company on May 4, 1999
(or had an application pending on or before that date), and continue to
control that thrift).
330 Under the GLBA, a change in control would result in termination of the
grandfathered unitary thrift holding company status. Id. Under the GLBA,
more than one hundred unitary thrift holding companies received grand-
fathered status. See Muckenfuss & Eager, supra note 48, at 42.
186 Vol. 31
THAT WHICH WE CALL A BANK
supervision with $7.2 trillion in total U.S. assets, controlling 451
thrifts with total assets of $1.2 trillion.33 The recent crisis, however,
332
significantly weakened the industry3. As a result, by 2010, there
were 437 thrift holding companies under OTS supervision with $4.2
trillion in total U.S. assets, controlling 399 thrifts with total assets of
$723 billion."'
The Dodd-Frank Act significantly reformed the structure of
thrift regulation by eliminating the OTS and transferring its authority
to regulate thrifts and thrift holding companies to the OCC and the
Federal Reserve, respectively, and by taking other steps to effectively
erase regulatory differences between thrifts and banks. Under the
Dodd-Frank Act, unitary thrift holding companies that were
grandfathered by the GLBA generally retain their exempt status and
ability to engage in commercial activities. However, the new legisla-
tion requires grandfathered unitary thrift holding companies to place
all of their financial activities in a separate intermediate holding
company that is subject to regulation and supervision by the Federal
Reserve as a SLHC.334 The ultimate parent entity is obligated to
serve as a "source of strength" to such an intermediate holding
company and is subject to limited examination and enforcement by
the Federal Reserve. 3 3 5  All other thrift holding companies-the
"non-exempt" SLHCs, whether unitary or multiple-are now limited
to conducting activities permitted to BHCs and "financial in nature"
331 OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, 2010 FACT BOOK: A STATISTICAL
PROFILE OF THE THRIFT INDUSTRY 80 [hereinafter, OTS 2010 FACT BOOK]
(2011).
332 The failure of Washington Mutual, the country's largest savings
association based in Seattle, was a critical blow to the thrift industry. In
September 2008, the federal government seized Washington Mutual, which
was heavily exposed to risky mortgage-backed assets and suffered from a
creditor run, and struck a controversial deal to sell its assets to J.P. Morgan.
See Robin Sidel et al., WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to JP. Morgan, In Largest
Failure in U.S. Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at Al; see
also Dain C. Donelson & David Zaring, Requiem for a Regulator: The
Office of Thrift Supervision's Performance During the Financial Crisis, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1777, 1779 (2011) (discussing the impact the failure of
Washington Mutual had on the U.S. economy as part of the larger financial
crisis).
333 OTS 2010 FACT BOOK, supra note 33 1, at 69.
334 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 626, 124 Stat. 1376, 1604 (2010).
335 id.
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activities permissible to FHCs.336 Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act kept the
GLBA exemption from activity limitations for grandfathered unitary
thrift holding companies, while at the same time eliminating most, if
not all, meaningful differences between regulation of BHCs and thrift
holding companies.
This example raises a broader question whether the defini-
tional boundaries between "banks" and various groups of financial
institutions specifically determined not to be "banks" under the
BHCA scheme are going to retain their practical importance in the
emerging post-Dodd-Frank regulatory regime.
V. Looking Back, Thinking Forward: Lessons ofHistory and
Regulatory Reform
A closer look at the history of the BHCA provides a
contextual framework for understanding current trends in the
financial sector regulation reform. This Part discusses some of these
trends. First, it examines the potential impact of the Dodd-Frank Act
on the continuing practical relevance of the BHCA definition of
"bank" and the statutory exemptions from that definition. Moving to
broader issues of regulatory process and design, this Part offers some
general observations on potential lessons of the history of the BHCA
for the ongoing regulatory reform.
A. What's in a Name? Exemptions from the BHCA
Definition of "Bank" after Dodd-Frank
The existence of statutory exemptions for certain bank-like
institutions from the BHCA definition of "bank," and the resulting
exemption for their parent companies from regulation under the
BHCA, continues to be a matter of concern to lawmakers.
The recent controversy over Wal-Mart's attempt to acquire
an ILC reignited the broader debate on the continuing utility of these
exemptions shortly before the latest financial crisis brought forth
more pressing policy issues.337 In 2009-10, the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") conducted its first Financial Sector
Assessment Program ("FSAP") review of the consolidated regulation
and supervision in the United States and, among other things,
336 Id. For a list of "financial in nature" activities, see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(k)(4) (2006).
337 See supra notes 328-333 and accompanying text.
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recommended the elimination of all existing exemptions from the
BHCA definition of "bank.""' The IMF's FSAP report was
completed on July 23, 2010, shortly after Congress passed the Dodd-
Frank Act.3 39 Although the legislative history of the Dodd-Frank Act
shows that Congress debated eliminating at least some of the
exemptions,340 the final version of the legislation did not go that far.
Instead, the Dodd-Frank Act imposed a three-year moratorium on the
FDIC's approval of deposit insurance applications by ILCs, credit
card banks, or trust banks controlled by commercial firms.34' The
moratorium also extends to the approval by the relevant federal
banking regulators of any change in control of these entities.342
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act directed the GAO to
conduct a study and develop policy recommendations with respect to
the continuing desirability of the existing exemptions from the
definition of "bank" under the BHCA.343 Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
the GAO study has to identify which exempted institutions are
controlled or affiliated with commercial companies; determine
whether the existing regulatory framework adequately addresses the
risks associated with these institutions' activities and affiliations; and
evaluate potential consequences of eliminating these exemptions and
subjecting their parent companies to the BHCA.344
The inclusion of these provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act
illustrates Congress' continuing concern over the practical impact of
338 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note 8, at 3. The IMF FSAP report
recommended the creation of a single federal program of consolidated
regulation and supervision, which would be administered by the Federal
Reserve and cover "all holding companies that own one or more FDIC-
insured depository institutions, regardless of the charter type and without
exception, plus any other financial firms deemed to be potentially
systemic." Id. at 4. Moreover, the report recommended that all groups
subject to consolidated regulation and supervision be prohibited from
"engaging in most commercial activities." Id. at 14.
339 Id at 3.
340 Id. at 16.
341 Dodd-Frank Act § 603(a)(2). "Commercial firm" is defined as any entity
that derives less than fifteen percent of its consolidated annual gross
revenues from activities that are financial in nature, as defined in section
4(k) of the BHCA, or from ownership or control of insured depository
institutions. Id. § 602.
342 Id. § 603(a)(2).
343 Id. § 603(b)(1).
344 Id. § 603(b)(2).
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breaching the wall between banking and commerce. 345 As the
landscape of the U.S. financial industry changes in response to the
crisis and post-crisis legislation, Congress is signaling its resolve to
reaffirm this foundational principle of U.S. regulatory framework and
to reinforce the central importance of the BHCA within that
framework.
It remains to be seen whether Congress will take any
legislative action to amend or limit exemptions from the BHCA in
the near future or to foreclose the existing avenues for commercial
ownership of deposit-taking institutions, including ILCs or trust
companies. Placing Congress's actions in the context of the historical
evolution of the BHCA, however, raises a broader question about the
continuing significance of the statutory definition of "bank," and the
exemptions from that definition, in the post-crisis regulatory
environment.
The regulatory reform envisioned in the Dodd-Frank Act has
potentially profound consequences in this respect. The explicit
exemptions under CEBA were ultimately traceable to the same
policy rationale that the exempted institutions did not pose risk of
excessive concentration of commercial credit and, more generally,
economic and political power. An additional rationale for the
exemptions was the fact that some of these entities, such as thrifts
and credit unions, were subject to parallel regulatory regimes.
Despite their differences, ILCs, thrifts, credit unions, limited purpose
trust companies and credit card banks were perceived to be small- or
medium-size entities that generally operated in local markets and
offered a limited set of specialized services. As the functions and
business operations of these institutions changed in response to legal
and market developments, however, the statutory exemptions
remained frozen in their 1987 form. This made ILCs and thrifts
particularly attractive to non-bank financial and commercial
companies that sought access to FDIC-insured deposits and wanted
to develop lending capabilities without triggering the BHCA's
registration requirements.
The creation of an integrated oversight of all SIFIs, including
systemically significant non-bank financial companies, potentially
345 In fact, the legislative history of Section 603 of the Dodd-Frank Act
shows that the House version explicitly contemplated significantly limiting
the scope of the existing exemptions for savings associations and ILCs from
the definition of "bank" under the BHCA. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§
1301(a)(4)(A), 1301(a)(4)(D) (2009).
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eliminates the key incentive for large financial institutions to avoid
being regulated as a BHC. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, systemically
important non-bank financial companies, SLHCs, and companies that
voluntarily register as SHCs will be subject to consolidated regula-
tion and supervision by the Federal Reserve under somewhat
differing schemes that essentially mirror those applicable to BHCs.
Accordingly, whether or not any such institution controls an entity
that falls within the statutory definition of "bank," or qualifies for an
exemption from that definition, becomes far less critical than it was
before the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act. For example, the Volcker
Rule is part of the BHCA but it applies to all "banking entities,"
defined as any insured depository institution or its affiliates.346 Thus,
technically, the Volcker Rule applies to companies that own or
control FDIC-insured ILCs, thrifts, limited purpose trust companies
or credit card banks.
A related development is the increasing convergence
between the regulatory regime governing thrifts and thrift holding
companies and the regulation of commercial banks and BHCs. With
the elimination of the OTS and the transfer of regulatory authority
over thrifts and SLHCs to the OCC and the Federal Reserve, the
practical differences between these once parallel regulatory schemes
are disappearing.347 The only continuing exceptions are the unitary
thrift holding companies grandfathered by the GLBA, which may
348
still be owned or controlled by commercial entities.
Despite the continuing uncertainty associated with the Dodd-
Frank implementation process, it is possible to hypothesize about the
future of the exemptions from the BHCA definition of "bank" under
the emerging systemic risk regulation regime. To the extent any ILC,
thrift, credit union, any other financial institution exempted from the
definition of "bank," or such institution's parent company is deemed
to be a systemically important non-bank financial company, the
parent company will become subject to the Federal Reserve's
consolidated supervision, regulation and enforcement authority in a
manner similar to BHCs. Commercial companies that own these
institutions will still be able to carry on their commercial activities
but may be required to consolidate all of their financial activities
346 Dodd-Frank Act § 619.
347 See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
348 See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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under a single intermediate holding company subject to the Federal
-- 349Reserve's supervision.
The Dodd-Frank Act is probably going to alter most
drastically the role of thrifts. Even leaving aside the impact on
systemically important thrifts or SLHCs, the advantages of owning a
thrift, as opposed to a commercial bank, are likely to erode
significantly, as the two previously parallel regulatory regimes
continue to converge. 350 As the implementation of the Dodd-Frank
Act continues, many large, systemically important SLHCs may
choose to convert their thrifts into commercial banks that have
broader powers.
With respect to other exemptions, the key factor is whether a
particular institution is designated as systemically important. For all
systemically significant non-bank financial companies, the exemp-
tions from the definition of "bank" are likely to lose practical
relevance. It does not seem likely that many credit unions, limited
purpose trust companies or credit card banks will be designated as
systemically important financial institutions for the purposes of
consolidated regulation by the Federal Reserve. These institutions
generally operate in certain clearly delineated market niches,
primarily by virtue of membership or activity limitations. These
limitations also render them less likely to threaten either the old
statutory objective of separating banking and commerce or the new
goal of systemic risk prevention.
By contrast, however, an ILC that is not systemically
important may remain a convenient vehicle for non-banking financial
and commercial companies to access federally insured deposits
without having to register with the Federal Reserve as a BHC.
Because today's ILCs effectively function as full-fledged state-
chartered commercial banks, control of an ILC may still be a
valuable opportunity for a non-banking financial or commercial
company.
It is not clear yet whether Congress will take legislative
action to amend or limit exemptions from the BHCA or to prohibit
commercial ownership of ILCs and other deposit-taking institutions.
It is clear, however, that any such action by itself is likely to fall
short of addressing the more fundamental policy issues in financial
regulation reform. Understanding the evolution of the BHCA
349 Dodd-Frank Act § 167(b).
350 See supra notes 334-336 and accompanying text.
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definition of "bank" and the broader shifts in the statute's policy
focus helps to outline some of these issues.
B. Reflections on Regulatory Reform Issues
Several interrelated themes relevant to today's policy debates
emerge from our discussion.
The history of the BHCA definition of "bank" illustrates the
fundamental dynamics of financial sector regulation as a constantly
evolving product of the complex interaction between the government
and industry actors. Scholars have long recognized the cyclicality of
the regulatory process in various contexts.35 1 The familiar discourse
of "deregulation vs. re-regulation," however, tends to be heavily
normative.352 Tracing the evolution of the definition of "bank" in the
BHCA paints a more subtle picture of how law shapes the
developments in the financial markets and how it is, in turn, shaped
by the changing market practices and institutions.
The story presented in this Article reveals an inherent
conceptual tension in the statutory scheme. On the one hand, the
BHCA seeks to restrict permissible activities of entities affiliated
with commercial banks (the restrictive element). On the other hand, it
seeks to allow such bank-affiliated entities to conduct a broader
range of business activities than those permissible for a commercial
351 See, e.g., Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: the
Link between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 223 (1995); ALAN GART, REGULATION, DEREGULATION, REREGULA-
ION: THE FUTURE OF THE BANKING, INSURANCE AND SECURITIES
INDUSTRIES (1994).
352 See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008
Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 1 (2011) (arguing that deregulation of
derivatives under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
caused the financial crisis of 2008); Joseph Karl Grant, What the Financial
Services Industry Puts Together Let No Person Put Asunder: How the
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 - the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act - Contributed to the 2008-2009 American Capital Markets Crisis, 73
ALB. L. REV. 371 (2010) (arguing that deregulation of the U.S. financial
sector brought by the GLBA was one of the direct causes of the recent
financial crisis); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making
of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L. J. 1521 (2005) (arguing that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is an example of ill-conceived over-regulation).
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bank (the permissive element).5 The history of the BHCA is a series
of congressional attempts to find an elusive balance between these
two opposite intentions under intense pressure from various interest
groups. Congress periodically revisited the statute and strengthened
its restrictive element in the name of high-level policy goals, such as
preventing excessive concentration of financial and economic power
or ensuring safety and soundness of the banking system. At the same
time, between 1956 and the enactment of CEBA in 1987, Congress
also gradually loosened statutory restrictions by redefining the key
term "bank" and creating implicit or explicit exemptions from its
scope.
As this Article demonstrates, every cycle of restrictive legis-
lation also created unforeseen opportunities for private industry
actors to avoid the BHCA's restrictions, often by exploiting
definitional technicalities. In the heavily regulated banking industry,
private market actors constantly search for ways to escape onerous
regulatory requirements that limit their profitability potential.
Extensive restrictions on their activities, investments and geographic
footprint gave commercial banks and BHCs particularly strong
incentives to expand their product offerings and market reach to
compete successfully with less intrusively regulated financial
intermediaries entering traditional banking business lines. The twin
forces of technological progress and financial innovation enabled
firms to deliver financial services in ways that defied existing legal
and regulatory boundaries. In response, Congress embarked upon the
next round of statutory amendments that tightened some provisions
of the BHCA but compromised on others, creating a new set of
unforeseen regulatory arbitrage opportunities.
Revisiting this history puts the process of implementation of
the Dodd-Frank Act in a sobering perspective. History shows that
any legislation imposing restrictions on financial institutions'
activities creates conditions for the emergence of new methods of
regulatory arbitrage, as the affected institutions respond to new
constraints on their business. Statutory and regulatory definitions and
exemptions often play a critical role in determining the scope of the
restrictions and, accordingly, the nature of the industry's response.
Statutory definitions often become the frontline in political and
353 Thus, the GLBA is the most important example of expanding the
permissive element of the bank holding company regulation in the United
States.
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economic battles, as the constant interplay of government action and
industry reaction shapes the path of financial innovation.
Thus, one of the lessons of history for today's policymakers
is the importance of adopting a dynamic view of regulatory reform,
which aims to anticipate potential market responses to legislative
action and to build adjustment mechanisms into the regulatory
regime. Effective regulatory design has to incorporate an assumption
that some degree of arbitrage in reaction to regulation is inevitable
and, under certain circumstances, may even be desirable as a
correction signal. The Dodd-Frank Act's approach to this issue
seems to focus primarily on regulatory jurisdiction. In the Dodd-
Frank Act, Congress delegated to regulatory agencies the authority to
fill in numerous gaps and ambiguities in the statutory language.
Conceivably, as market conditions change over time, regulators will
exercise their authority to adjust the regulatory regime accordingly.
The Federal Reserve in particular received unprecedented powers to
regulate and supervise all systemically significant financial institu-
tions under its newly expanded jurisdiction.354 By actively exercising
its oversight responsibilities, the Federal Reserve is, in effect,
expected to act as the key watchman protecting the system against
the undesirable effects of regulatory arbitrage. In addition, the Dodd-
Frank Act created the Financial Stability Oversight Council
("FSOC"), an interagency systemic risk regulator, 355 and the Office
of Financial Research ("OFR"), an office inside the Treasury
Department that supports FSOC by identifying and analyzing data
356
relevant to systemic risk prevention. The FSOC and the OFR are
expected to operate as the structural and informational center of the
new regulatory architecture and to provide a unified regulatory
perspective on the developments in financial markets.
In theory, this may be viewed as a strong built-in adjustment
mechanism that should provide the necessary flexibility for the
regulatory regime to respond to changes in market conditions. In
practice, however, it remains to be seen how effectively these
regulatory agencies will use their statutory powers to achieve the
stated goals. Financial regulators' ability to implement their official
mandate depends greatly on complex organizational, political, and
ideological factors and incentives.
354 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
355 Dodd-Frank Act § 111.
356 Id. § 152.
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The history of the BHCA underscores the central role
interest group politics and economic pluralism play in creating
incentives for regulators and Congress to react to changes in the
marketplace. Both the enactment of the BHCA and its subsequent
amendments were, to a great extent, a result of intense lobbying by
independent community bankers and small local businesses seeking
to protect their market share from the big "money-center" banks. In
1956, these local elites were the real winners because the original
version of the BHCA effectively allowed them to combine the
ownership of a local bank and a variety of commercial businesses,
while protecting them from out-of-state competition. 357 Later, when
large money-center banks discovered that the use of a one-bank
holding company structure allowed them to offer banking services
across state lines, the same coalition of independent community
banks and local businesses successfully lobbied Congress to close
that "loophole" in the BHCA.15 ' By the mid-1980s, the combination
of high interest rates, inflation and intensified competition among
financial intermediaries created strong incentives for large BHCs and
other companies to use FDIC-insured "nonbank banks" to avoid the
increasingly stifling legal and regulatory constraints. In 1987, the
independent community banks again succeeded in pushing through
Congress an amended definition of "bank" in the BHCA, which
brought all FDIC-insured institutions within its scope but created
several explicit exemptions, primarily for deposit-taking institutions
that were locally-owned niche service providers.359
Since the late 1980s, though, the balance of economic and
political power between community banks and large financial
institutions has fundamentally changed. The wave of consolidations
in the banking industry, globalization, rapid financial innovation, the
growth of complex financial product markets, and the repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act's prohibition on affiliations between banks and
other financial institutions led to the increased concentration of assets
and capital among the country's largest bank conglomerates. 360
Today it is a relatively small group of large diversified financial
357 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
358 See supra notes 90, 94, 97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161, 173, 179 and accompanying text.
360 See generally Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S.
Financial Services Industry, 1975 2000: Competition, Consolidation, and
Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (2002) (discussing the rapid rise
and expansion of large financial services firms).
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companies, rather than the far more numerous group of small and
community banks, that plays the critical role in shaping the
regulatory and legislative dynamics in the financial services sector.
How does that shift in political power affect the dynamics
and potential substantive outcomes of the current regulatory reform
in the financial sector? Scholars have argued that massive bailouts of
large banks and investment banks during the 2007-09 crisis
exacerbated the moral hazard and "too big to fail" problems.3 62
Others go as far as claiming that the Dodd-Frank Act effectively
created a new corporatist regime that solidifies government
partnership with the largest financial institutions and makes future
bailouts of such institutions inevitable. On the other hand, it is hard
to deny that, in the immediate aftermath of a major crisis, the
weakened political clout of the country's largest financial institutions
led them to lose many political battles over the new legislation.36 4
Developing a thorough understanding of the political dynamics of the
adoption and ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act would
require careful research and analysis that go beyond the scope of this
Article. 6 An examination of the role of interest group politics in
361 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to
Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2010, at Al (describing the financial
industry's lobbying efforts seeking to influence the implementation of the
Dodd-Frank Act); John Plender, How to Tame the Animal Spirits, FIN.
TIMES (London), Sept. 30, 2009, at 11 (stating that, in 2007, there were five
financial industry lobbyists per member of Congress). Of course, this is not
to say that small- and medium-sized banks do not have any lobbying power
and do not exert any political influence today. Wal-Mart's unsuccessful
attempts to establish an ILC provide a recent example of their continuing
ability to protect their group interests. See supra notes 224-229 and
accompanying text.
362 See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE
WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010)
(arguing that government bailouts of large financial services firms created
conditions for future financial crises).
363 See generally DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDER-
STANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES
(2010) (arguing that the key theme in the Dodd-Frank Act is the creation of
a partnership between the government and the largest financial institutions).
364 The creation of the CFPB and the adoption of the Volcker Rule are
examples of such political battles.
365 See, e.g., Kim Krawiec, Don't "Screw Joe the Plummer:" The Sausage-
Making of Financial Reform (Nov. 11, 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
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shaping BHC regulation, however, may potentially enrich that debate
by placing it in a broader historical context.
Conclusion
This Article does not purport to present an exhaustive and
detailed analysis of the entire political or economic history of bank
holding company regulation in the United States. Rather, its goal is
to examine one particular aspect of that history-the evolution of the
BHCA definition of "bank" and the principal exemptions from that
definition. Incomplete as it may be, this story highlights some of the
key economic, social and political factors that shaped the current
institutional structure of the U.S. financial services market and
regulation. Without a thorough understanding of the genesis of that
structure, it is difficult to envision an effective method of redesigning
it to meet today's regulatory challenges. By revisiting the past, this
Article ultimately seeks to contribute to the emergence of a more
self-reflexive and context-sensitive approach to financial regulation
reform.
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1925431
(providing an example of this type of analysis).
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